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ABSTRACT—Few institutions have done more to improve working 
conditions for the middle class than labor unions. Their efforts, of course, 
cost money. To fund union activities, thousands of collective bargaining 
agreements across the nation have long included provisions permitting 
employers to require employees to pay “fair share” or “agency” fees. In 
public unions—when the employer is the government—this arrangement 
creates tension between two important values: the First Amendment’s 
protection against compelled expression and the collective benefits of 
worker representation. When confronted with this tension forty years ago in 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Supreme Court struck an uneasy 
compromise, allowing public sector unions to recoup expenses for 
collective bargaining but not for political activity. For decades, the decision 
has been a lightning rod with some scholars calling for its reversal and 
others insisting on its preservation. In the meantime, the realities of modern 
public sector collective bargaining have changed, and First Amendment 
jurisprudence has evolved. The Supreme Court, which recently granted 
certiorari in Janus v. AFSCME, now has the opportunity to reconsider 
Abood’s fragile compromise. 
This Article offers a new way forward within the First Amendment 
that honors the importance of both union activity and free expression. It 
proposes a method to reconcile these twin interests while also updating the 
doctrine to account for state legislative efforts, modern union realities, and 
First Amendment jurisprudential developments.  The Article argues that 
agency fees should be brought into step with current political contribution 
and campaign finance jurisprudence. Under this middle-ground approach, 
some agency fees, but only those that are “closely drawn” to avoid 
unnecessary expressive infringement, will remain lawful. This approach 
may not satisfy those who ardently oppose agency fees of any kind or those 
who want Abood’s rule fully upheld. Still, it emerges as the best way 
forward through a difficult terrain: It avoids the false dichotomy between 
union and political activities, respects state legislatures that craft innovative 
collective bargaining statutes, and grounds public sector agency fees with 
other coherent aspects of First Amendment jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For forty years, the law of public sector collective bargaining has 
teetered on a single precedent, reflecting an uneasy compromise. Under the 
approach established in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,1 public 
employers and unions may enter into limited “agency shop” agreements as 
a means for unions to recoup their collective bargaining and contract-
related expenses. Unions may charge nonmembers “agency” or “fair share” 
fees in “exclusive representation” regimes on the grounds that nonmembers 
also obtain the benefits of collective bargaining.2 In contrast, unions are 
forbidden from using agency fees to cover expenses incurred to express 
their ideological or political views because requiring nonmembers to 
subsidize such expressive activities would violate their First Amendment 
rights.3 This compromise, hinging on the distinction between collective 
bargaining and political activities, has proven to be as divisive as it has 
been enduring.4 
For decades, the scholarly literature on Abood has generally fallen into 
two distinct camps. On one side, critics have lambasted the decision as 
inconsistent with First Amendment principles, theorizing that agency fees 
compel the expression of nonmembers.5 On the other side, scholars have 
defended Abood’s compromise as a justified means of promoting state 
government interests in efficient labor relations and preventing “free 
riders.”6 As the Supreme Court prepares to consider a direct challenge to 
 
 1 431 U.S. 209, 221–22 (1977). 
 2 Id. at 222; see also Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 301 (1986); infra 
Section I.A (explaining exclusive representation and the exclusive bargaining representative’s status as 
representative of all bargaining unit employees). 
 3 Abood, 431 U.S. at 222, 234–35; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment 
commands that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” The Court has read 
the word “speech” broadly, frequently using it interchangeably with communicative “expression.”E.g., 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406–07 (1989). Protection for nonexpressive conduct that facilitates 
speech, such as group association and financial contribution rights, is derived from this freedom. E.g., 
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (describing a right of expressive association). 
 4 Compare Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012) (describing 
Abood’s justifications as “something of an anomaly,” but declining to overrule it), with id. at 335 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s characterization of Abood as anomalous, and 
describing the lines Abood draws and the balance it strikes as reflective of the Court’s general 
evaluation of claims that a condition of public employment violates the First Amendment). 
 5 See, e.g., Daniel R. Levinson, After Abood: Public Sector Union Security and the Protection of 
Individual Public Employee Rights, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1977); Hugh L. Reilly, The Constitutionality 
of Labor Unions’ Collection and Use of Forced Dues for Non-Bargaining Purposes, 32 MERCER L. 
REV. 561 (1981). 
 6 See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional 
Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 3, 6 (1983); Matthew Dimick, Labor 
Law, New Governance, and the Ghent System, 90 N.C. L. REV. 319, 354 & n.187 (2012) (citing Joe C. 
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Abood and the agency fees it permits this term in Janus v. AFSCME, these 
twin views must be meaningfully revisited. 
Both of these traditional camps overlook two key developments. First, 
public sector labor statutes and union activity look very different now than 
they did four decades ago. Second, First Amendment jurisprudence has 
evolved to protect not only familiar conceptions of free speech but also 
emerging interests in association and spending. These developments 
foreclose any effort to neatly overrule Abood on free speech grounds. 
This Article proposes a better way to conceptualize agency fees and a 
better way for courts, unions, and reformers to navigate the complex 
intersection of public unions and individual expressive rights within an 
existing First Amendment framework.7 It suggests that agency fees be 
brought into step with current political contribution and campaign finance 
jurisprudence by viewing compelled contributions as the mirror image of 
contribution restrictions. In this framework, instead of limiting agency fees 
to those germane to collective bargaining, courts would limit agency fees 
to those reasonably necessary to perform the union’s statutory duties as an 
exclusive bargaining representative. Under this “statutory duties” 
framework, agency fees subsidizing union activities that arguably infringe 
on payers’ rights would be tolerated. But the collective bargaining statute 
permitting these activities and agency fees must be “closely drawn” to 
 
Davis & John H. Huston, Right-to-Work Laws and Free Riding, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 52 (1993)); Cynthia 
Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 174–75, 186 (2015); 
Levinson, supra note 5. The term “free riders” in this context refers to nonunion employees who obtain 
the benefits of collective bargaining without incurring its costs. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 225–26; see 
also Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2656 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (pointing out that free 
ridership creates a uniquely severe “collective action problem” because, with the union required to 
negotiate benefits for both employees who pay and those who do not, “not just those who oppose but 
those who favor a union have an economic incentive to withhold dues; only altruism or loyalty—as 
against financial self-interest—can explain their support”). For more labor relations perspectives on the 
relationship between collective bargaining and free riders, see generally KURT L. HANSLOWE ET AL., 
UNION SECURITY IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT: OF FREE RIDING AND FREE ASSOCIATION (1978). For other 
perspectives, see also MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (economic 
perspective on free riders); Robert Albanese & David D. van Fleet, Rational Behavior in Groups: The 
Free-Riding Tendency, 10 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 244 (1985) (organizational theorists’ analysis of free 
riders and their impact on group productivity); Gary N. Chaison & Dileep G. Dhavale, The Choice 
Between Union Membership and Free-Rider Status, 13 J. LAB. RES. 355 (1992) (empirical analysis of 
the overall impact of free riders on labor and industrial relations). 
 7 This Article assumes the threshold applicability of the First Amendment in public sector agency 
fee claims, and limits its exploration of legal alternatives to within the First Amendment’s boundaries. It 
resigns itself to the First Amendment’s use because that is what the Supreme Court has done for over 
forty years. However, I have reservations as to whether compelled agency fees are expressive enough to 
implicate a First Amendment constitutional starting point. 
112:597 (2018) Reconciling Agency Fee Doctrine 
601 
avoid unnecessary abridgements and match a “sufficiently important 
[government] interest.”8 
Bringing agency fees in line with campaign finance jurisprudence has 
several virtues. It logically tethers the doctrine to other modern First 
Amendment principles while still respecting Abood’s foundational 
judgment that some forms of public sector agency fees may be 
constitutional. Political contribution jurisprudence also fits the agency fee 
context because it allows courts to recognize that monetary contributions 
can be expressive, without automatically imposing the standard of strict 
scrutiny that attends to pure political speech.9 Furthermore, political 
contribution jurisprudence is flexible enough to recognize the political tone 
of some union activities, while also giving deference to the expertise of 
state legislatures that have weighed a host of legitimate interests in crafting 
their collective bargaining statutes. 
While some of the most persuasive commentators and the current 
Court have reviewed agency fees in the public sector through a First 
Amendment analysis, their approach either erroneously defines the conduct 
of agency fee payments as pure political expression, or as contributions 
triggering an “exacting scrutiny” standard of review.10 Once such an 
approach is taken, strict or exacting scrutiny dooms the states’ interests, 
notwithstanding state legislatures’ efforts to tailor agency fees and 
collection procedures to meet government interests in public sector 
collective bargaining.11 That the government faces a heightened burden 
when it singles out pure political speech is a relatively uncontroversial 
principle. But that limited or compelled contributions are permitted the 
 
 8 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 
(1976)). 
 9 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. 
 10  Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 314 (2012); Martin H. Malin, The 
Evolving Law of Agency Shop in the Public Sector, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 858–59 (1989); see also 
Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2639 (in which the majority appears to endorse Knox’s “exacting scrutiny” 
standard, despite professing that “no fine parsing of levels of First Amendment scrutiny is needed” for 
the facts of the case). 
 11 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting 
the strong presumption against constitutionality that accompanies “strict scrutiny” analysis); see also 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444 (“Under exacting scrutiny, the Government may regulate protected 
speech only if such regulation promotes a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means to 
further the articulated interest.”). “Exacting scrutiny” is merely a linguistic twist on the familiar strict 
scrutiny standard, and in practice the two analyses and outcomes are the same. See id. (exacting scrutiny 
as implicitly amounting to strict scrutiny); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 724 (2012) (plurality 
opinion) (equating “exacting scrutiny” with “most exacting scrutiny” and both with the standard strict 
scrutiny test); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66, 68 (describing “exacting scrutiny” as “[t]he strict test,” and 
including a discussion of “least restrictive means” in its analysis, a hallmark of the strict scrutiny test). 
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same First Amendment freedoms as pure political speech is an anomalous, 
and antiquated, feature of agency fee jurisprudence. 
This Article’s approach also avoids the strained dichotomy between 
ordinary union activities and political expression. When the Court decided 
Abood, public sector collective bargaining statutes were still in their 
infancy. Because these early statutes resembled the private sector model, 
the majority’s belief that one could readily distinguish political and 
collective bargaining expenses in both sectors was justified.12 But in 
today’s current collective bargaining climate, public union activities are 
harder to categorize. Public sector collective bargaining can be political 
when it extends to issues of public policy such as classroom size and 
teacher tenure. Similarly, political activities like lobbying can relate to 
collective bargaining, such as when legislation is proposed for the sole 
purpose of limiting the permissible bargaining subjects in public sector 
employment.13 Moreover, according to the Court’s dicta in Harris v. Quinn, 
even the most quintessentially traditional collective bargaining subject—
wages—can reach important political issues in the public sector, 
particularly in an age of ballooning state payrolls and unbalanced budgets.14  
Fortunately, states’ collective bargaining laws have evolved into 
specifically customized balancing acts of competing interests. Many of 
them remove issues of public policy from the scope of public sector 
collective bargaining, establish notice and “opt-in/out” agency fee 
procedures, and restrain agency fees to a prescribed proportionate amount 
in order to limit unnecessary constitutional abridgments.15 Thus, Abood’s 
true flaw is that its dated analysis leaves no room for respect and 
consideration of modern legislative initiatives concerning public sector 
collective bargaining and agency fees. 
To be sure, this compelled contribution alternative to agency fee 
analysis in the public sector will not fully satisfy either of the original hard-
line scholarly camps. Fair compromises rarely do. Admittedly, limiting 
 
 12 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223, 229 (1977). 
 13 See id.; see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 522 (1991) (holding that agency 
fees may only be used to subsidize lobbying activities within the limited context of facilitating contract 
ratification or implementation). Lehnert is a prime example of this strained dichotomy between union 
activities and political expression. The product of a badly fractured Court, Lehnert was written by 
justices with divergent views as to the political nature (and agency fee chargeability) of six different 
categories of union expenditures. 
 14 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632. 
 15 E.g., IND. CODE §§ 20-29-6-3 to 20-29-6-4 (2011) (limiting the scope of collective bargaining); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:14A-5.5 (West 2017) (limiting agency fees to a proportionate amount); WASH. 
REV. CODE. ANN. § 42.17A.495 (West 2017) (replacing opt-out agency fee requirement with an annual 
opt-in requirement); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.91 (West 2017); see also infra Section II.C. 
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agency fees to cover those expenses reasonably necessary to perform the 
statutory duties of an exclusive bargaining representative provides a 
narrower set of circumstances than Abood’s germane-to-collective-
bargaining rule permits. Conceivably, under this new approach, courts will 
look specifically at the language in the collective bargaining statute at issue 
and permit agency fees only for bargaining and contract administrative 
activities related to the statute’s permissive and mandatory bargaining 
subjects. Unions would thus be excluded from charging agency fee payers 
for organizing activities, lobbying designed to expand the scope of 
collective bargaining, extra-unit litigation pools, and a number of other 
union expenses that were once arguably chargeable to agency fee payers 
under Abood. However, the current Court insists that all agency fees are 
expressive and refuses to grant broad “government-qua-employer” latitude 
to states’ determinations that permitting agency fee collection as part of 
their collective bargaining statute best manages their public workforce.16 
This suggests that, in a future challenge, agency fees used to cover 
germane-to-collective-bargaining expenses are already lost. As such, 
reimagining Abood through a compelled contribution framework that limits 
agency fees to the costs of performing statutory duties certainly paints a 
brighter picture than a contra-Abood world that prohibits them entirely. 
For some longtime opponents of Abood, the framework proposed here 
probably does not go far enough to protect agency fee payers’ First 
Amendment rights. Viewing compelled agency fees as significant 
infringements on an objector’s expressive interests, these opponents 
purport to apply the most stringent forms of judicial scrutiny to all political 
expressions including agency fees. Those who advocate for Abood’s 
demise purely for First Amendment doctrinal consistency, however, should 
find it difficult to reconcile such paramount protections of individual 
objecting-payer speech with the expressive rights of unions themselves—
rights that unions logically have after Citizens United v. FEC.17 
 
 16 Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2639; see also id. at 2653. The ability to use agency fees to cover these 
union expenses, like the rest of the chargeable expenses under the current Abood doctrine, is gone if 
Abood is overturned and agency fees in the public sector are held unconstitutional. See Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1968). The 
“government-qua-employer” principle refers to the Court’s attempts to place the government in the 
same position as private employers when it comes to basic employment matters. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 
2653. Consistent with this notion, the government has broader discretion to restrict an employee’s 
words and actions when it acts as employer than when it acts as sovereign. But see id. at 2641 (noting 
that the Supreme Court has never “seen Abood as based on Pickering balancing”). 
 17 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010); see Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out 
Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 802 (2012) (noting that campaign finance laws 
have always constrained the political spending of unions and corporations equally). Presumably, when 
the Court recognized the political speech rights of corporations under the First Amendment in Citizens 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
604 
This Article’s intervention is timely. The Court recently granted 
review in Janus v. AFSCME to consider whether to overrule Abood and 
invalidate public sector agency fees under the First Amendment.18 Justice 
Neil Gorsuch, who replaced Justice Antonin Scalia in April 2017, has 
expressed a desire to clarify the level of scrutiny applicable to contribution 
limits—and a general awareness of the discontinuity within the Court’s 
evolving First Amendment doctrines.19 Thus, reexamining the prevailing 
approach to public sector agency fees with the Court’s full complement of 
Justices and the added presence of Justice Neil Gorsuch presents an 
opportunity to clarify some of the doctrine’s ambiguities, and to bring it in 
accord with modern public union activities, statutory frameworks, and First 
Amendment principles. 
Part I begins this effort by addressing the origins of agency fees and 
agency shop agreements in both the public and private sectors of 
employment. It starts by discussing the statutes and legislative materials 
associated with early collective bargaining in the private sector and 
examines the Supreme Court cases attending to agency shop agreements 
and fees. It then highlights the Court’s reliance on private sector case 
analysis in the public sector agency fee challenge, Abood v. Detroit Board 
of Education, and illustrates how this reliance rendered Abood’s First 
Amendment analysis incomplete. Furthermore, this Part discusses the 
Court’s procedural additions to the workings of Abood several years later in 
Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson.20 It concludes with a 
discussion of the Court’s most recent decisions on agency fees in order to 
highlight the concerns which current Supreme Court Justices have 
expressed in trying to reconcile current First Amendment doctrine with 
public sector agency fees. 
 
United, it also reinforced the same constitutional rights of unions. See also Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1023, 1026–28 (2013) (observing the inconsistency between Citizens United and the line of 
agency fee cases, in that Citizens United’s “recent expansion of the rights of corporations to speak over 
the objections of dissenting members cannot be squared with Knox’s expansion of the right of dissenters 
to restrict union speech”). 
 18 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom. Janus v. AFSCME 138 S. Ct. 54 (Sept. 28, 
2017) (No. 16-1466) (Illinois state employees asking the Court to overrule Abood on First Amendment 
grounds). Like Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016), in which an eight-
Justice Court deadlocked 4–4, the Janus litigation is funded by the National Right to Work Legal 
Defense Fund. Adopting a deliberate litigation strategy, the Janus appellants conceded that Abood is 
controlling law in the lower courts, inviting a ruling against them on the basis of the pleadings. This 
strategy is used to get cases to the Supreme Court as quickly as possible. 
 19 E.g., Riddle v. Hickenlooper, 742 F.3d 922, 930 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(confessing “some uncertainty about the level of scrutiny the Supreme Court wishes us to apply to [a] 
contribution limit challenge”). 
 20 475 U.S. 292 (1986). 
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Part II examines the historical evolution of public sector unionism 
since Abood was decided in 1977. It addresses the push to transplant the 
private sector legal model into the public sector and the early premises and 
assumptions this push rested on. Part II also expands upon the differences 
in private and public sector employment and explains how these 
differences have changed in response to evolutions in public sector 
collective bargaining and union activities. Finally, Part II explains the most 
recent legislative attacks on public sector collective bargaining and public 
union responses. 
Part III explains the underlying First Amendment principles and 
precedents that affect the public sector agency fee doctrine, such as 
individual speech and association rights. This Part then argues that after 
close examination, the modern precedents and rationales behind most of 
these areas of law support a compelled political contribution framework 
and standard of review. 
Finally, Part IV describes a better alternative to overruling Abood in 
Janus: retuning public sector agency fee analysis to the frequencies of 
compelled contributions and “closely drawn” scrutiny. Such a retuning 
would remove the focus on agency fees as “speech,” or union activities as 
“political,” and instead zero in on the state’s collective bargaining statute. 
Agency fees would thus represent only a proportionate share of expenses 
necessary to perform the duties of an exclusive bargaining agent as defined 
in the statute. In describing this trimmed agency fee alternative that tailors 
chargeable expenses to the statutory duties, this Article proposes viable 
avenues for public unions and legislative bodies to construct an efficient 
regulatory scheme, establish a collective bargaining environment, and limit 
unnecessary constitutional infringements. These avenues include 
nontraditional statutory language, chargeability models, organizational 
schemes, and mechanisms for nonmember participation and voice. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF AGENCY FEES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
The sources of agency fee doctrine in both the public and private 
employment sectors should be briefly summarized for perspective. 
A. Agency Fees in the Private Sector 
Federal law governs agency shop agreements and other labor matters 
in most industries of private sector employment. As part of the New Deal 
initiatives, Congress enacted the first comprehensive federal labor statute, 
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the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Wagner Act), in 1935.21 
The NLRA sought to promote the rights of workers to unionize, or 
designate representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of 
bargaining collectively over terms and conditions of employment.22 Under 
the NLRA, once employees in a bargaining unit properly certified a labor 
organization or representative, employers were required to bargain 
collectively with (and only with) the certified representatives of their 
employees.23 This duty to bargain collectively encompassed two American 
labor law doctrines that remain fundamental: “good faith bargaining” and 
“exclusive representation.”24 
The doctrine of exclusive representation made it an unfair labor 
practice for employers to bargain with employees who were not designated 
representatives of a certified union.25 It strengthened the union’s role within 
the bargaining process by designating exclusive representation as the sole 
path to bargaining, but it also limited individual employees’ rights to enter 
into employment agreements themselves.26 Because of this limitation, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that exclusive representation creates a duty for the 
 
 21 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1935); see also Leon H. Keyserling, The 
Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 199, 203 (1960). Other New 
Deal legislation included such working improvements as regulating child labor, creating the eight-hour 
workday, and establishing the social safety net featuring social security. 
 22 29 U.S.C. § 151. New Deal law reformers, like President Franklin D. Roosevelt, campaigned on 
an economic platform in direct opposition to the “trickle down” approach of prior administrations, and 
the NLRA’s promotion of collective bargaining reiterated Roosevelt’s Keynesian policy of investing in 
and empowering the working class. Keynesian economics advocates for the expansion of the welfare 
state and for the government to step in to assist the economy generally in times of economic depression 
by buying things itself. See Gerald Friedman, American Labor and American Law: Exceptionalism and 
Its Politics in the Decline of the American Labor Movement, 11 LAW CULTURE & HUMAN. 30, 39 
(2015). 
 23 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(a), 158(a)(5). For union election and certification procedures, see 29 U.S.C. 
§ 159(c). 
 24 See 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (requiring the parties to “meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment”).The NLRA also states 
that once a labor organization is properly selected according to the procedures established within the 
Act, that labor union “shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the 
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other 
conditions of employment.” Id. § 159(a). See also Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A 
Comparative Inquiry into a “Unique” American Principle, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 47, 47 (1998) 
(referring to the principle of exclusive representation as “[t]he fundamental ordering principle which 
shapes American labor law and collective bargaining”). 
 25 See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683–84 (1944). Under the NLRA, to 
obtain exclusive representation status, at least a majority of bargaining unit employees during a 
certification election must endorse a union. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c). 
 26 See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944) (“The very purpose of providing by statute 
for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms 
which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group.”). 
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union to negotiate fairly on behalf of all represented employees.27 This duty 
of fair representation entitles all represented employees to equal application 
of the contract terms for which the union bargained with the employer.28 
Since fair representation meant that all covered employees were 
presumably benefitting from the union’s services and bargained-for 
contract terms, the NLRA allowed for unions and employer contracts to 
include union security agreements. The NLRA’s provisions initially 
permitted several forms of union security agreements, including “closed 
shops” that required represented employees to join and remain members of 
the union as a condition of employment and “agency shops” that required 
nonmember employees to pay fees to a union for services rendered as their 
bargaining representative.29 The Act permitted unions to seek such security 
to promote “labor peace” and prevent represented employees from “free 
riding,” or benefitting from the union representation afforded to all 
employees in a bargaining unit without paying for it.30 
Twelve years after the NLRA became law, Congress met to discuss 
what it perceived to be a corrective response to some of the Act’s collective 
bargaining policies.31 The NLRA’s allowance for all types of union security 
agreements had led to allegations of unrestrained union power and abuse, 
and amending that allowance was at the top of Congress’s agenda.32 Thus 
Congress—inclined to swing the pendulum of power back towards 
employers but recognizing the value some form of union security had on 
stabilizing the collective bargaining process—passed the Labor 
 
 27 Id. at 336. 
 28 See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 194, 202–04 (1944). Although in Steele the 
Supreme Court applied the duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), the Court’s 
reasoning made clear that the duty applied equally under the NLRA. The Court, without opinion, 
confirmed this application to the NLRA. Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, Local No. 23, 
350 U.S. 892 (1955); see also Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1926); infra note 34. 
 29 In addition to closed shops and agency shops, there are several other more obscure types of 
agreements made during collective bargaining that fall under the general heading of “union security.” 
See CHARLES HANSON ET AL., THE CLOSED SHOP : A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN PUBLIC POLICY AND 
TRADE UNION SECURITY IN BRITAIN, THE USA AND WEST GERMANY 121–23 (1982) (defining several 
other forms of collective agreements including the “union shop,” the “preferential shop,” 
“[m]aintenance of membership,” and “[c]heck-off agreements”). 
 30 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 762–63 (1961) (discussing decisive past 
congressional hearings regarding the cost of exclusive representation and the burden of nonmembers 
who participate in the benefits without contribution). 
 31 See J. Michael Guenther, Note, Labor Law — Union Security — The Agency Shop and State 
Right-to-Work Laws, 35 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 547, 547–48 (1960). 
 32 See id. at 547; see also NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2012). Section 158(a) of the Wagner Act’s 
provision that “nothing in this chapter . . . or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an 
employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of 
employment membership therein” permitted all forms of union security agreements. Id. 
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Management Relations Act (LMRA or the Taft-Hartley Act) in 1947.33 The 
LMRA, among other things, prohibited all forms of union security 
agreements except for agency shop agreements.34 Furthermore, § 14(b) of 
the LMRA allowed individual states to restrict all forms of union security 
agreements, including agency shops, within their own jurisdiction.35 
B. Agency Fees and the Private Sector Trilogy of Hanson, Street,          
and Allen 
The Supreme Court’s first three constitutional challenges related to 
agency fees arose in the private sector under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 
prior to public sector employees securing any significant collective 
bargaining rights.36 In Railway Employees’ Department v. Hanson, the 
Court dismissed a First Amendment association claim, finding no evidence 
on the record that requiring employees to finance an exclusive bargaining 
representative that engaged in political activities “force[d] men into 
ideological and political associations which violate their right to freedom of 
 
 33 Pub. L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). Section 8(a)(3) 
of the Taft-Hartley Act amended § 8(3) of the Wagner Act, the relevant provision allowing for agency 
shop agreements. 
 34 Id. Taft-Hartley added the following language to the original Section 8(3) proviso: 
[t]hat no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a 
labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not 
available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other 
members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or 
terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the 
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. 
Id.; see also Norman L. Cantor, Uses and Abuses of the Agency Shop, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61, 61 
n.2 (1983) (“Although the statutory language refers to union ‘membership’ as a condition of 
employment, the NLRA has been interpreted to refer to ‘financial core membership’ rather than full 
union membership. Thus what appears to be a union shop authorization is actually an agency shop 
authorization.”) (citing 601 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1979); Local Union No. 749, Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers 
v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 343, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 741–42 
(1963); United Stanford Emps. Local 680 v. NLRB; Wine & Liquor Store Emps., Local 122, 
261 N.L.R.B. 1070 (1982)). 
 35 29 U.S.C § 164(b). Eleven states passed laws restricting union security agreements either before 
or contemporaneously with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. See Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 
§ 152 (2012). While the LMRA governs labor relations in most private sector industries, the major 
exceptions are the railway and airline industries, which are governed by the RLA. Although the original 
RLA was actually enacted in 1926—before the LMRA and the NLRA—for the last seventy years many 
of its provisos have been amended to mirror the LMRA and homogenize labor law in all private 
industries. Four years after enacting the LMRA, Congress amended the union security provisions in the 
RLA to permit agency shop agreements between employers and unions in the railroad industry, 
notwithstanding any state law to the contrary. 45 U.S.C. § 152; S. REP. NO. 81-2262, at 1 (1950). The 
RLA union security provision was modeled after § 8(a)(3) of the LMRA and is intended to embody 
identical constraints. See S. REP. NO. 81-2262, at 1; see also Lykins v. Aluminum Workers Int’l Union, 
510 F. Supp. 21, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (refusing to accept a difference between the NLRA’s union security 
clause and precedent and the RLA’s). 
 36 See 45 U.S.C. § 152. 
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conscience, freedom of association, and freedom of thought.”37 Hanson 
involved employees under a closed shop agreement who simply did not 
want to join the union or pay any related dues.38 When it rejected defining 
compulsory payments to a union as per se violations of associational 
freedoms, the Hanson court did not resolve the free speech implications 
that might arise if such collected fees were used for purposes unrelated to 
collective bargaining. In declining to decide this issue, the Court noted that 
“if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover 
for forcing ideological conformity . . . this judgment [would] not prejudice 
the decision in that case.”39 
Five years later, the Court was confronted with the issue Hanson had 
reserved in International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street.40 In Street, a group 
of Georgia employees claimed that a portion of their compelled union fees 
went towards the union’s financing of political causes they opposed, in 
violation of their First Amendment speech rights.41 Determined to avoid 
answering the constitutional question, a plurality of the Court interpreted 
the relevant provisions in the RLA as prohibiting such political uses of fees 
because they were completely unrelated to the purpose behind collective 
bargaining.42 In his plurality opinion, Justice William Brennan reasoned 
 
 37 351 U.S. 225, 236 (1956). Because the record in Hanson provided little detail as to the specific 
uses of agency fees, the Court noted that agency fees in this case “is no more an infringement or 
impairment of First Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is 
required to be a member of an integrated bar.” Id. at 238; see also infra Section III.3. 
 38 Hanson, 351 U.S. at 227. In addition to a dismissal on First Amendment grounds, the Hanson 
Court also dismissed a challenge to agency shop provisions as a violation of the right to work liberty 
interest grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 235. In evaluating both the 
First Amendment and due process challenges, the Hanson Court first determined that it had jurisdiction 
because the RLA’s preemption of state statutes that prohibit agency fee agreements was sufficient state 
action to subject the provision of a contract between a private union and a private company to 
constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 232 (“If private rights are being invaded, it is by force of an agreement 
made pursuant to federal law which expressly declares that state law is superseded. In other words, the 
federal statute is the source of power and authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed.” 
(citation omitted)); see also Crawford v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, 870 F.2d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(rejecting the argument that subsequent Supreme Court decisions have overruled the finding of state 
action in Hanson). 
 39 Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238. 
 40 367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
 41 Id. at 744–45. 
 42 Id. at 749–50, 768, 770 (“[Section] 2, Eleventh is to be interpreted to deny the unions the power 
claimed in this case.”). Although not part of the plurality opinion, four justices in Street did address the 
constitutional issue. Justice Harlan joined Justice Frankfurter’s dissent and rejected the First 
Amendment claim finding that payments in return for representational services even when used to 
promote workers’ interests by political means did not significantly infringe upon fee payers’ rights to 
speak, think, and associate as they pleased. Id. at 805–06 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). On the other 
hand, Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas, each writing separately, maintained that the use of 
compelled fees for political causes seriously violated an objector’s First Amendment freedom to speak, 
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that Congress’s purpose in drafting the union security provisions of the 
RLA was not to vest “unions with unlimited power to spend exacted 
money” but rather to eliminate “free riders” and to equally distribute “the 
burden of maintenance by all of the beneficiaries of union activity.”43 Thus, 
because “promot[ing] the propagation of political . . . concepts and 
ideologies” was outside of the scope of the intended policies behind the 
statutory purpose (preventing free riders and ensuring labor peace), union 
fees could not be used for this intent over a fee payer’s objection.44 
The Court decided in Street that compulsory union fees collected to 
support the collective bargaining activities of a union acting as an exclusive 
representative do not violate free association rights but that union dues that 
are used to support political causes could violate free speech rights. In 
doing so, it forced a hard line of permissibility between the two categories 
of collected union fees—those made to cover collective bargaining 
expenses (agency or fair share fees) and those used for political 
expenditures. Justice Brennan went on to acknowledge that there may be 
some union activities that do not neatly fit into either of the Court’s 
articulated categories.45 The Street Court, however, provided “no view” as 
to where the line should be drawn for these expenditures when an 
employee objects to subsidizing them with her fees.46 Like its predecessor, 
the Street Court willingly left a palpable chasm in its compelled union fees 
jurisprudence. 
Speaking for the Court two years later in Brotherhood of Railway & 
Steamship Clerks v. Allen,47 Justice Brennan reaffirmed his position in 
Street that union fee objectors cannot be forced to support political 
ideologies. Although decided on procedural grounds, Allen found that the 
RLA prohibits unions from using an employee’s fees to support political 
 
think, and support causes of their choice. Id. at 778 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 788 (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
 43 Id. at 766–68 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). Furthermore, on agency shop fees Justice 
Brennan contended: 
Its use to support candidates for public office, and advance political programs, is not a use which 
helps defray the expenses of the negotiation or administration of collective agreements, or the 
expenses entailed in the adjustment of grievances and disputes. In other words, it is a use which 
falls clearly outside the reasons advanced by the unions and accepted by Congress why authority 
to make unionshop agreements was justified. 
Id. at 768. 
 44 Id. at 744; see id. at 763 (quoting Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 235 (1956)). In 
distinguishing political activities from union activities that are germane to collective bargaining, the 
Street Court acknowledged that there may be some activities that are both unnecessary to effectuate 
collective bargaining and are neither political nor ideological. Id. at 768–69. 
 45 Id. at 769–70. 
 46 Id. at 769. 
 47 373 U.S. 113 (1963). 
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causes that the payer opposes and that in the case of opposition the union 
bears the burden of providing “a division of the union’s political 
expenditures from those germane to collective bargaining.”48 While 
handing down this procedural burden to unions, the Allen Court, like the 
Street Court before it, also reasserted the validity of objectors being 
compelled to pay agency fees for collective bargaining purposes.49 
Although incomplete, the Hanson, Street, and Allen trilogy provided 
the foundational doctrine for agency shop agreements and fees in the 
private sector. They established for purposes of future analysis that union 
expenditures fall into three categories: (1) those germane to collective 
bargaining, (2) those made in support of political causes and activities, and 
(3) all other expenses that fall into neither of the above categories. Because 
they support the government’s purpose behind union security provisions 
allowing agency shop agreements, expenses in the first category are 
chargeable to an objecting fee payer. Expenses within the second category 
are not. Finally, the cases establish that it is the union’s responsibility to 
determine which part of their expenditures are chargeable as agency fees—
a complex determination because many union activities may not neatly fit 
into the first two categories. 
C. Agency Fees in the Public Sector 
When Congress enacted the NLRA and the LMRA, it exempted 
public employers such as government agencies from coverage. Early 
adversaries to collective bargaining in the public sector based their 
opposition on a belief that such allowances were in conflict with existing 
civil services laws or, at the very least, unnecessary due to the protections 
they already afforded.50 Others opposed granting bargaining rights to public 
servants, believing that doing so would inevitably lead to future strikes that 
would endanger the public.51 Even lauded social democrat President 
 
 48 Id. at 121. The Allen Court places this burden on the union mainly for practical reasons, 
contending that “[s]ince the unions possess the facts and records from which the proportion of political 
to total union expenditures can reasonably be calculated, basic considerations of fairness compel that 
they, not the individual employees, bear the burden of proving such proportion.” Id. at 122. 
 49 Id. at 121–22. Because the record in Allen was insufficient to determine what portion of the 
objector employees’ fees were being used to finance political activities, the Court remanded the case, 
instructing the lower court to determine: “(1) what expenditures disclosed by the record are political; (2) 
what percentage of total union expenditures are political expenditures.” Id. at 121. 
 50 See Joel M. Douglas, State Civil Service and Collective Bargaining: Systems in Conflict, 52 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 162, 163–64 (1992); David Lewin & Raymond D. Horton, The Impact of Collective 
Bargaining on the Merit System in Government, 30 ARB. J. 199, 200–01 (1975). 
 51 See Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369, 1376 (2009) 
(noting that the threat of strike was behind several early court decisions against public sector employer 
collective bargaining, despite the union’s recognition that strikes were not permissible). 
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Roosevelt opposed strikes related to public sector collective bargaining, 
fearing chaos if employees responsible for performing public health and 
safety services, such as police and firefighters, ever went on strike.52 Other 
opponents thought that merely the fear of a public employee strike would 
be exploited by public employees at the bargaining table in order to win 
excessive economic concessions.53 Still others saw the NLRA as ripe for 
constitutional challenge and refrained from the public sector collective 
bargaining discussion until the issue was fully resolved in the private 
sector.54 
Sentiments changed, however, in the three decades that followed, 
when public sector employment increased fourfold in the United States, 
 
 52 Letter from Franklin Roosevelt, President, United States, to Luther C. Steward, President, Nat’l 
Fed’n of Fed. Emps. (Aug. 16, 1937), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15445 
[https://perma.cc/FB32-BYH6]. But see MYRON LIEBERMAN, PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING 29 (1980) 
(noting that “the word ‘essential’ was used without qualifications” to define all public employees, and 
that some government services “are hardly essential to public health and safety”). 
 53 See Russell A. Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment Labor 
Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MICH. L. REV. 891, 892–94 (1969); see also KURT L. 
HANSLOWE, THE EMERGING LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 11–20 (1967) (“To 
the extent that collective bargaining entails joint determination of conditions of employment, such 
bargaining with the government is seen as unavoidably creating an interference in the sovereign’s 
affairs.”). See generally Charles M. Rehmus, Labor Relations in the Public Sector in the United States, 
109 INT’L LAB. REV. 199 (1974). Other practical considerations may have also delayed public sector 
unionization. Public sector employees prior to the 1960s “were not generally dissatisfied with their 
terms and conditions of employment and therefore, except in isolated cases, did not press for collective 
bargaining rights” before then. Id. at 202. Moreover, prior to the 1960s, private sector unions and their 
international federations were probably fully occupied in trying to increase the extent of organization in 
the private sector. Id. Only after union membership in the private sector began to decrease did these 
private sector international unions begin to see the large and growing number of public sector 
employees as a fertile alternative. Id. 
 54 See generally JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE 
LAW AND THE STATE, 1900–1962 (2004). Responses to early twentieth century attempts to secure 
bargaining rights in the public sector suggest that a majority of the public also opposed it. In September 
of 1919, nine people were killed and hundreds more were injured when the city was left lawless for 
three days after over 70% of Boston’s police force went on strike. Joseph Slater, Labor and the Boston 
Police Strike of 1919, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STRIKES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 241, 246–47 (Aaron 
Brenner et al. eds., 2009). Before the strike, Boston police officers worked regular weeks of between 
seventy-three hours and ninety-eight hours and were sometimes required to remain on duty for 
seventeen hours straight. Id. at 246. Following the strike, Massachusetts’ then-obscure governor, Calvin 
Coolidge, fired all 1,147 of the striking officers and denounced their behavior. Id. at 241. His hard 
stance was applauded by the media and Boston civilians—who collected $471,758 to pay state guards 
until replacements were found—and thrust Coolidge into the political spotlight. Id. at 250. By 1923, 
Calvin Coolidge was the thirtieth President of the United States. Francis Russell, The Strike That Made 
a President, 14 AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1963, http://www.americanheritage.com/content/strike-made-
president [https://perma.cc/WPD8-4NNE]. Unfortunately for public sector unions, courts and officials 
opposing public sector unionism sometimes cited the Boston Strike as a cautionary tale through the end 
of the 1940s. See Joseph E. Slater, The Court Does Not Know “What a Labor Union Is”: How State 
Structures and Judicial (Mis)constructions Deformed Public Sector Labor Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 981, 
1010, 1013 (2000). 
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outpacing employment growth in the private sector.55 As public employees 
grew in number and the NLRA’s Supreme Court successes renewed 
confidence in the collective bargaining process, several state legislatures 
enacted laws granting limited bargaining rights to public employees 
beginning in the late 1950s.56 While most of these statutes resembled the 
private sector collective bargaining structure of the LMRA and adopted 
similar union security language, others chose to codify their more 
restrictive policies on union security agreements as permitted under Section 
14(b) of the LMRA.57 The result was a piecemeal collection of state 
legislation governing collective bargaining between state and local 
governments and their employees. 
1. The Court’s Application of Private Sector Agency Fee Doctrine to 
the Public Sector: Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 
Following its private sector decision in Allen, the Court was silent on 
agency fees for nearly fifteen years. During these years, significant 
collective bargaining rights arrived in the public sector for the first time.58 
 
 55 See Developments in the Law—Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1614–15 (1984). 
 56 See id.; see also Project, Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public Employment, 19 UCLA L. 
REV. 887, 893 (1972). Wisconsin enacted the first state public sector bargaining law in 1959 with 
Minnesota quick to follow. Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at 1678. Thirty additional states 
followed suit during the 1960s and 1970s. Id. at 1679. President John F. Kennedy followed the states’ 
trend and granted bargaining rights to federal employees in 1962 by signing Executive Order 10988. 
Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. § 521 (1962). Earlier federal legislation like the Lloyd-LaFollette Act 
of 1912 provided some formal protections for federal agency employees. Lloyd-LaFollette Act, ch. 389, 
§ 6, 37 Stat. 555 (1912) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7511 (2012)). The Lloyd-LaFollette Act, for example, 
provided essentially a “just cause” termination requirement, but there were no significant appellate 
rights for a decisionmaker’s just cause decision. See Veterans Preference Act, ch. 287, § 8, 58 Stat. 389 
(1944) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2108 (2012)) (providing veterans who enter into public service 
employment the right to challenge adverse personnel actions). It was no coincidence that Wisconsin 
was the first state to pass legislation granting collective bargaining rights to public employees. See Mari 
Jo Buhle, The Wisconsin Idea, IN IT STARTED IN WISCONSIN: DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONT LINES OF 
THE NEW LABOR PROTEST 14 (Mari Jo Buhle & Paul Buhle eds., 2011); Paul Buhle & Frank 
Empsak, Labor, Social Solidarity, and the Wisconsin Winter, in IT STARTED IN WISCONSIN, supra, 
at 101–03; Roger Bybee, The Role of Corporations, in IT STARTED IN WISCONSIN, supra, at 139. In 
1932, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)—now the 
largest union of public employees in the United States—was first established as a public employee 
association by a small group of professional state employees in Madison, Wisconsin. Buhle & 
Empsak, supra, at 101–02.  
 57 See HANSON ET AL., supra note 29, at 143–45. 
 58 See Joseph Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past Thirty Years, 
30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 511 (2013). In 1956, the first year for which statistics on membership in 
public sector unions were kept, there were 915,000 union members in the public sector. By 1978, public 
sector membership had grown by 296% to 3,625,000. Myron Lieberman, Teacher Bargaining: An 
Autopsy, 63 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 231, 232 tbl.1 (1981). 
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Moreover, during this period the Court also settled important First 
Amendment principles relating to financial contributions.59 
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of agency 
shop agreements in the public sector in Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education.60 In Abood, a group of teachers objected to the payment of 
agency fees under a collective bargaining agreement entered into between 
the Detroit Board of Education and their union representative.61 The 
petitioners argued first that Hanson and Street did not apply because 
agency fees in the public sector, and not just those utilized for political 
purposes, required a different First Amendment consideration than their 
private sector counterparts.62 Second, they argued that even under the 
Hanson and Street analysis, union costs for collective bargaining cannot be 
charged to agency fee payers because “public sector collective bargaining 
itself is inherently political.”63 
Writing for the majority in Abood, Justice Potter Stewart began by 
rejecting the petitioner’s First Amendment public–private distinction to 
employment and collective bargaining. Justice Stewart reasoned that, 
although there may be “very real differences” between public and private 
collective bargaining, these differences are related to the special character 
of the employer and not the employees.64 Thus, these differences “are not 
such as to work any greater infringement upon the First Amendment 
interests of public employees.”65 According to Justice Stewart, “[p]ublic 
employees [were] not basically different from private employees; on the 
whole, they have the same sort of skills, the same needs, and seek the same 
advantages.”66 
With the argument for a private–public distinction disposed of, Justice 
Stewart then applied the agency fee analysis outlined in Hanson and Street. 
 
 59 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 60 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 61 Id. at 212–13. The Detroit Federation of Teachers was certified as the exclusive representative of 
teachers employed by the Detroit Board of Education in 1967 following a secret ballot election. See 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 432.211 (1979) (extending some bargaining rights to public employees). The 
Court noted in Abood that “although not identical in every respect,” Michigan’s agency shop provisions 
were “broadly modeled after federal law.” Abood, 431 U.S. at 223 (citing Rockwell v. Bd. of Educ., 
227 N.W.2d 736, 744–45 (Mich. 1975); Mich. Emp’t Relations Comm’n v. Reeths–Puffer Sch. Dist., 
215 N.W.2d 672, 675 & n.11 (Mich. 1974); Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 
214 N.W.2d 803, 807–08 (Mich. 1974)). 
 62 Abood, 431 U.S. at 213–14; see also Brief for Appellants at 189–96, Abood, 431 U.S. 209 (No. 
75-1153), 1976 WL 181666. 
 63 Abood, 431 U.S. at 227 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64 Id. at 230. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 229–30. 
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He began by adopting the same government interests supporting agency 
fees in the private sector to Abood, noting that “[t]he desirability of labor 
peace is no less important in the public sector, nor is the risk of ‘free riders’ 
any smaller.”67 Justice Stewart’s analysis, however, deviated from Hanson 
and Street as to how these interests impacted First Amendment rights. 
Hanson and Street recognized these government interests in deciding that 
agency fees used for collective bargaining purposes do not infringe upon an 
agency fee payer’s association rights.68 In Hanson and Street, the Court 
found that agency fees compelled a payment in exchange for the union’s 
collective bargaining services and likened this to other government-
compelled fees in exchange for goods or services.69 Therefore, Hanson and 
Street saw no compelled association in agency fees because the required 
agency fee payment was not likely to result in identifying the agency fee 
payer with the union.70 Abood, however, stated that compelled financial 
support of a union might infringe upon an individual’s First Amendment 
association rights but that such an infringement is justified to promote 
government interests.71 
Although the Abood Court was unclear as to its reasons behind 
adopting this alternative, its reliance on Buckley v. Valeo is instructive.72 
Decided just one year prior to Abood, Buckley dealt with the constitutional 
validity of a federal law limiting campaign contributions.73 After a 
complicated and lengthy analysis, Buckley held that limiting contributions 
“inpinge[s] on protected associational freedoms.”74 The Abood Court—
reasoning that compelling contributions is no less of an infringement than 
restricting them—cited Buckley for its proposition that “contributing to an 
organization for the purpose of spreading a political message is protected 
by the First Amendment.”75 Thus, Abood may have attempted to reconcile 
Buckley’s somewhat “incomprehensible” analysis and new holding that 
 
 67 Id. at 224. 
 68 See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 770 (1961); Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 
351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956). 
 69 See Street, 367 U.S. at 768; Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238; see also supra Section I.B. 
 70  Street, 367 U.S. at 767–68; Hanson, 351 U.S. at 236–38. 
 71 Abood, 431 U.S. at 226–27 (1977) (reasoning that requiring a public employee to subsidize 
collective bargaining “might well be thought . . . to interfere in some way with an employee’s freedom 
to associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so”). 
 72 See id. at 234 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 73 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1. 
 74 Id. at 22; see also JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME 
COURT 149 (2012) (contending that Buckley v. Valeo “has gone down in history as one of the Supreme 
Court’s most complicated, contradictory, incomprehensible (and longest) opinions”). 
 75 Abood, 431 U.S. at 234. 
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contributions implicate the First Amendment with the settled agency fee 
precedent of Hanson and Street.76 
After upholding the initial validity of agency fees in the public sector 
context, Abood then went on to consider their validity when used to 
promote political or ideological activities.77 Relying heavily on its analysis 
in Hanson and Street, the Court unanimously held that the First 
Amendment prohibits the Government from “requiring any [objecting 
nonmember] to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may 
oppose.”78 
Indeed, after Abood, agency fee doctrine in the public and private 
sector had drawn the same bright line and reached parallel compromises 
but through different routes.79 Union activities germane to collective 
bargaining were chargeable to objecting agency fee payers, and political 
activities were not. The only relevant distinction a majority of the Court 
acknowledged between public and private sector unions in Abood was that 
the line between political activities and activities germane to collective 
bargaining “may be somewhat hazier” in the public sector.80 However, the 
Abood Court declined to elaborate further as to which specific hazy union 
activities could be financed with an objector’s agency fees.81 
2. Criticisms of Abood 
Scholars have been writing on Abood’s shortcomings since it was 
decided, but for this Article, two lines of criticism are particularly relevant. 
First, some commentators criticize Abood’s failure to distinguish between 
public and private sector collective bargaining before deviating from the 
private sector agency fee precedent articulated in Hanson and Street.82 
Although Justices John Paul Stevens, William Rehnquist, and Lewis 
Powell all wrote separately in Abood, only Justice Powell saw the public 
sector and private sector union distinction as “fundamental,” noting that 
unlike their private sector counterparts: 
 
 76 See infra Part III. 
 77 431 U.S. at 232–37. 
 78 Id. at 235. 
 79 Estlund, supra note 6, at 184. 
 80 Abood, 431 U.S. at 236. 
 81 Id. 
 82 See, e.g., Andrew Buttaro, Stalemate at the Supreme Court: Friedrichs v. California Teachers 
Association, Public Unions, and Free Speech, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 341, 346–47 (2016). For a 
discussion of the differences between public and private sector collective bargaining generally, see, for 
example, HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 22 (1971); 
Clyde Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business: Principles and Politics, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 
265, 265 (1987); Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE 
L.J. 1156, 1157 (1974). 
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[P]ublic-sector union activities—including collective bargaining—have an 
inherently political cast. Indeed, a public-sector union functions much like a 
political party, as the ultimate objective of both “is to influence public 
decisionmaking in accordance with the views and perceived interests of its 
membership.”83 
Although enlightened in his recognition of how collective bargaining 
activities could inherit a political tone in the public sector, Justice Powell 
and his accompanying intellectuals’ casting of all public sector collective 
bargaining activities as inherently political is as shortsighted as Abood’s 
majority opinion. The true nature of collective bargaining activities in the 
public sector is that they are transient and context specific, which is why 
only a case-by-case balancing properly evaluates their activities and 
supporting agency fee payments.84 
A second line of criticism maintains that Abood’s interpretation of all 
agency fees as constitutional infringements is incomplete without a proper 
scrutiny of the state’s interests.85 If laws permitting agency fees infringe on 
a payer’s association rights, First Amendment jurisprudence requires that a 
court only sustain that action’s constitutionality if it can say, subject to 
“exacting scrutiny,” that the state has shown a compelling interest in 
imposing the fee.86 Furthermore, the action must be narrowly tailored so 
that the infringement is no greater than that which is necessary to advance 
the state’s compelling interest.87 
Justice Stewart did not subject the agency fee to this type of analysis 
in Abood.88 Instead Justice Stewart, limited by the lack of a developed 
record on which to scrutinize the Detroit Board of Education’s claims and 
narrowly tailor the agency fees, simply deferred to the Michigan 
legislature’s judgment that the agency shop provision promotes stable labor 
relations by preventing employees who are not union members from 
enjoying the benefits of collective bargaining without contributing to the 
costs of representation. Even assuming that the State’s interests were 
compelling, Justice Stewart did not scrutinize the relationship between that 
 
 83 Buttaro, supra note 82, at 348 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 250 (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 84 See infra Section II(B) & Section II(C). 
 85 See Malin, supra note 10, at 859. 
 86 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64; see also, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).  
 87 Id. 
 88 See generally Abood, 431 U.S. 209. Indeed, strangely, up until recently, no one on the Court had 
tried to articulate the standard of review in agency fee cases. 
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interest and the agency shop provisions, and his efforts to tailor the agency 
fees are nonexistent.89 
3. Hudson and Beyond: Making Abood Work in the Public Sector 
Several years after Abood, the Court articulated a practical addition to 
Abood’s public sector analysis in Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. 
Hudson.90 In Hudson, the Court held that a public sector “[u]nion should 
not be permitted to exact a service fee from nonmembers without first 
establishing a procedure which will avoid the risk that their funds will be 
used, even temporarily, to finance ideological activities unrelated to 
collective bargaining.”91 These “Hudson procedures” require public sector 
unions to provide annual “Hudson notices” to nonmembers, notifying them 
of their right to object to paying fees for nonchargeable expenses.92 The 
Court also required that Hudson notices provide nonmembers with “an 
adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt 
opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial 
decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while 
such challenges are pending.”93 In other words, Hudson held that the 
procedural ability of nonmembers to review union expenditures and “opt 
out” of paying nonchargeable expenses was constitutionally required under 
the First Amendment. 
Five years later, in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, the Court 
addressed one of the “somewhat hazier” union activities Abood alluded to 
and held that a union could not charge objecting employees for lobbying 
expenses.94 Both the Hudson and Lehnert Courts, however, wholeheartedly 
adopted Abood’s fundamental holding that agency fees were permissible in 
the public sector context. Justice Scalia’s concurring and dissenting opinion 
in Lehnert is noteworthy, however. In it, he appears to adopt a First 
Amendment analysis and a level of scrutiny similar to the standard this 
Article advocates: permitting agency fee payments only to the extent that 
they are reasonably necessary to perform the state-mandated duties of an 
 
 89 Although Justice Stewart’s failure to scrutinize the contribution of the agency shop to stable 
labor relations might be explained by the procedural posture of the case, he could have at least directed 
the lower court on remand to develop a record on which to scrutinize the state’s claims and narrowly 
tailor the agency fees. See Malin, supra note 10, at 860–61. 
 90 475 U.S. 292 (1986). 
 91 Id. at 305 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 244 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 92 See id. at 310. 
 93 Id. 
 94 500 U.S. 507, 518 (1991) (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 236); see also id. at 524 (“The union 
surely may not, for example, charge objecting employees for a direct donation or interest-free loan to an 
unrelated bargaining unit for the purpose of promoting employee rights or unionism generally.”). 
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exclusive representative; in other words, to act on the compelling state 
interest using the tools the government has designated within the statute.95 
4. The Court’s Move Away from Abood: Not on Its “[T]op-[T]en 
[L]ist of [F]avorite [P]recedents”96 
While Hudson and Lehnert represent decades where the Court applied 
Abood as controlling precedent, two more recent cases involving agency 
fees demonstrate the Court’s present inclination to question Abood’s First 
Amendment analysis and holding.97 In 2012, the Court in Knox v. Service 
Employees International Union, Local 1000 held that a union must send a 
new Hudson notice to represented employees if, during the year, union 
dues for members and the proportionate agency fee assessment for 
nonmembers changes due to additional political expenses that were not 
disclosed in the original notice.98 
Knox involved a California union that had increased its union dues by 
25% in order to defeat unanticipated ballot measures during a special 
election after Hudson notices were sent and the objection period had 
passed.99 While holding that the union violated the First Amendment by not 
sending a new Hudson notice, Justice Samuel Alito first reaffirmed that 
 
 95 See id. at 558–59, 562 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 96 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2652–53 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 97 See infra Part III. The Court’s inclination reflects the notable doctrinal changes to the First 
Amendment that have occurred over the past two decades. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310, 371–72 (2010) (reasoning that because political spending is a form of protected speech under the 
First Amendment, the government may not limit individuals from spending as much money as they 
want on political elections); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (explaining the 
First Amendment’s freedom of speech to include a complementary freedom not to speak). For an 
argument that the contemporary Court’s rethinking of free speech is best understood as a reaction to the 
Burger Court’s retrenchment from the expansive conception of free speech embraced by the Warren 
Court, see generally Keith Werhan, The Liberalization of Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court, 
80 IOWA L. REV. 51 (1994). 
 98 567 U.S. 298, 322 (2012). Knox followed a political shift in California, after longtime Governor 
Gray Davis was replaced with Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2003. Schwarzenegger’s fiscal reforms 
included ballot measures that required teachers to work longer before tenure eligibility and restricted 
political spending by public employee unions. See Steven Malanga, The Beholden State: How Public-
Sector Unions Broke California, CITY J. 18 (Spring 2010), https://www.city-journal.org/html/beholden-
state-13274.html [https://perma.cc/V4JK-GLQP]; see also BRIAN P. JANISKEE & KEN MASUGI, 
DEMOCRACY IN CALIFORNIA: POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE GOLDEN STATE 93 (2nd ed. 2008). 
The SEIU’s increased agency fees went to combating the objectionable ballot measures. The SEIU 
spent $20 million campaigning against the measures, with the California Teachers Association (CTA) 
contributing an additional $53 million. Mark Brenner, California Nurses Lead the Fight Against Arnold 
Schwarzenegger’s Anti-Union Ballot Measures, LAB. NOTES (Feb. 18, 2006), 
http://www.labornotes.org/2006/02/california-nurses-lead-fight-against-arnold-schwarzeneggers-anti-
https://www.facebook.com/messages/t/24607605union-ballot-measures [https://perma.cc/GA4L-
BLTQ]. Schwarzenegger’s four ballot initiatives lost overwhelmingly. See JANISKEE & MASUGI, supra, 
at 93. 
 99 567 U.S. at 304. 
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agency fees represent a “significant impingement on First Amendment 
rights.”100 Although he declined to revisit the propriety of this infringement 
in Knox, Justice Alito did go on to express the belief that some public 
sector collective bargaining is political. In doing so, he noted that: “a 
public-sector union takes many positions during collective bargaining that 
have powerful political and civic consequences,” positions with which 
nonmembers may disagree.101 The Knox decision went on to explicitly 
rebuke the Abood Court’s assumption without any “focused analysis” that 
public and private sector agency shop agreements are the same102 and to 
question the free-rider justification, calling it “generally insufficient to 
overcome First Amendment objections,” and “something of an anomaly.”103 
The Court admonished Abood even further two years later in Harris v. 
Quinn. In Harris, the Court held that home healthcare professionals, jointly 
employed by both the State of Illinois and individuals, were not required to 
pay agency fees.104 Justice Alito again asserted that Abood wrongly applied 
the private sector agency shop analysis to the public sector, noting that 
“[t]he Abood Court seriously erred in treating Hanson and Street as having 
all but decided the constitutionality of compulsory payments to a public-
sector union.”105 According to Justice Alito: 
Abood failed to appreciate the difference between the core union speech 
involuntarily subsidized by dissenting public-sector employees and the core 
union speech involuntarily funded by their counterparts in the private sector. 
In the public sector, core issues such as wages, pensions, and benefits are 
important political issues, but that is generally not so in the private sector. In 
the years since Abood, as state and local expenditures on employee wages and 
benefits have mushroomed, the importance of the difference between 
bargaining in the public and private sectors has been driven home.106 
Unimpressed by Abood’s holding and “questionable foundations,” the 
Harris Court refused to expand Abood to home healthcare workers who 
were not full-fledged government employees.107 However, by 
distinguishing home healthcare workers as beyond Abood’s purview, the 
 
 100 Id. at 310–11 (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455 (1984)). 
 101 Id. at 310 (citation omitted). 
 102 Id. at 313. 
 103 Id. 
 104 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644–45 (2014). 
 105 Id. at 2632. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 2638. 
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Court avoided the petitioners’ request to expressly overrule it.108 Justices 
Elena Kagan, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor 
dissented from the majority’s “potshots at Abood” in Harris.109 Justice 
Kagan vigorously defended the precedent, writing that “[f]or some 40 
years, Abood has struck a stable balance—consistent with this Court’s 
general framework for assessing public employees’ First Amendment 
claims—between those employees’ rights and government entities’ 
interests in managing their workforces.”110 In spite of her efforts, the 
majority’s intentions appeared inevitable. Although Abood had been 
reluctantly pardoned by the Court, after Harris it survived only on death 
row. 
Recognizing their close proximity to victory, opponents to agency fees 
quickly brought another case in 2015, but with the Court shorthanded after 
the death of Justice Scalia, Friedrichs v. California Teachers’ Ass’n 
resulted in a 4–4 per curiam decision.111 Undeterred, and hoping the Court 
would again take up the issue when restored to its full complement of 
Justices, agency fee opponents immediately began funding subsequent 
cases in the lower courts.112 In April 2017, Justice Gorsuch succeeded 
Justice Scalia,113 and five months later, the Supreme Court agreed to hear 
Janus v. AFSCME—its fourth agency fee case in five years.114 
 
 108 Id. at 2638 n.19. But see id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s refusal to 
overrule Abood is “cause for satisfaction, though hardly applause”). 
 109 Id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 110 Id. at 2658. Moreover, her dissent sniffed out the right-wing political objective behind the 
majority’s opinion in Harris and the circumstances surrounding it: 
For many decades, Americans have debated the pros and cons of right-to-work laws and fair-
share requirements. All across the country and continuing to the present day, citizens have 
engaged in passionate argument about the issue and have made disparate policy choices. The 
petitioners in this case asked this Court to end that discussion for the entire public sector, by 
overruling Abood and thus imposing a right-to-work regime for all government employees. The 
good news out of this case is clear: The majority declined that radical request. The Court did 
not, as the petitioners wanted, deprive every state and local government, in the management of 
their employees and programs, of the tool that many have thought necessary and appropriate to 
make collective bargaining work. 
Id. 
 111 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam). 
 112 See Moshe Z. Marvit, Labor Opponents Already Have the Next ‘Friedrichs’ SCOTUS Case 




 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
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II. NONJUDICIAL CHANGES TO PUBLIC UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING IN THE YEARS SINCE ABOOD 
Abood arrived at the Supreme Court when public sector labor statutes 
and collective bargaining were still in their infancy.115 Once a state enacted 
collective bargaining legislation, public sector employee associations were 
usually absorbed into existing private sector labor unions.116 A powerful 
force in the 1950s economy, these unions came to see the growing number 
of public employees as the solution to their steady private membership 
decline and aggressively sought to represent public sector employees.117 
 
 115 See Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 116 See Richard W. Hurd & Sharon Pinnock, Public Sector Unions: Will They Thrive or Struggle to 
Survive?, 25 J. LAB. RES. 211, 214–20 (2004). While most public sector employees were absorbed into 
existing unions, a few professional associations from the public sector successfully evolved into union 
representatives and have remained independent. The National Education Association (NEA) and the 
Fraternal Order of Police are the most prominent examples of professional associations that adopted 
union tactics and collective bargaining in order to retain their independent status. AFSCME and SEIU 
were the two most successful unions at absorbing past professional associations in the public sector. 
Largely because of their success in absorbing smaller associations, AFSCME and SEIU were also the 
two fastest growing unions during the 1970s and 1980s. See Leo Troy, Are Municipal Collective 
Bargaining and Municipal Governance Compatible?, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 453, 482 (2003). 
Teamsters and the Communication Workers of America were also able to absorb some professional 
associations but with less success. See City of Escanaba v. Mich. Labor Mediation Bd., 172 N.W.2d 
836, 841 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); State ex rel. Missey v. Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 42 (Mo. 1969) (holding 
that without a statutory provision to the contrary, public employees may join unions affiliated with 
national union organizations or unions that have private employees as members); Levasseur v. 
Wheeldon, 112 N.W.2d 894, 898 (S.D. 1962). 
 117 See DONALD H. WOLLETT ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 7 (4th 
ed. 1993). After the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) became affiliated with the United 
Autoworkers (UAW) and the AFL-CIO, the groups began an aggressive initiative in 1961 to win the 
representative status of public school teachers in major cities. Despite the NEA having more 
professional members, the resources and organizational activities of the AFT and its traditionally 
private union affiliates proved immensely successful because the AFT beat out the NEA for 
representational rights in the New York, Chicago, Baltimore, District of Columbia, Philadelphia, and 
Boston city school systems. Id. at 7–8. 
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A. The Early Differences Between Private and Public Employment and 
Collective Bargaining: “[A] [V]ery [F]at [M]an [S]tuffed into a [L]ittle 
Lord Fauntleroy [S]uit”118 
The successful incorporation of public sector employees into the 
traditionally private union model relied on the perception that public 
employees were in fact not discernible from their private counterparts.119 
And in a broad employment sense this was true, in that both public and 
private employees were concerned with fair wages and benefits, 
recognition, the redress of wrongs, and decent working conditions.120 
Because of these similarities, union leaders argued that the private sector 
model of collective bargaining—which involved good faith negotiations of 
wages and working conditions, a mutually binding contract for a specific 
duration, exclusive representation, and an agreement to share responsibility 
for administering the provisions of that contract—was also the most 
effective means of handling labor relations in the public sector.121 There 
were, however, important differences between the two as they related to 
public policy, leverage during negotiations, and individual guarantees of 
the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment.122 
First, the principal goals of government employees were politically 
determined, as opposed to private sector objectives that were economically 
driven.123 These politically determined goals, like politics itself, tended to 
 
 118 HERBERT L. HABER, PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE HELD BY THE INSTITUTE OF 
MANAGEMENT & LABOR RELATIONS 7–10 (1968) (discussing the relevance of private sector experience 
to public sector bargaining). Herbert L. Haber was City Director of Labor Relations, New York, New 
York, from 1966–1973. During a conference held by the Institute of Management and Labor Relations 
in 1968, Haber made this early observation when explaining the many differences between the private 
and public sectors of employment and why such differences meant that the rules for collective 
bargaining in the private sector could not be simply draped over the public sector without “extensive 
tailoring.” Id. at 10. To simply try and do so “recalls the cartoons I’m sure all of you have seen of the 
little boy wearing his daddy’s coat, or of a very fat man stuffed into a little Lord Fauntleroy suit.” Id. 
The author has tried and failed to locate any of these illustrious cartoons and fears they may have been 
lost to time. 
 119 Id. at 7–10. 
 120 Id. at 8. 
 121 See Jungin Kim, The Role of Public-Sector Unions During Privatization, 25 KOREAN J. POL’Y 
STUD. 23, 26 (2010). 
 122 See Local Distress, State Surpluses, Proposition 13: Prelude to Fiscal Crisis or New 
Opportunities?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the City of the H. Comm. on Banking, Finance and 
Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 397–98 (1978) [hereinafter Fosler] (statement of R. Scott Fosler, Director, 
Government Studies of the Committee for Economic Development); see also Connick v. Myers, 
461 U.S. 138, 149–52 (1983); Staughton Lynd, Employee Speech in the Private and Public Workplace: 
Two Doctrines or One, 1 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 711 (1977). See generally Gerald E. Frug, Does 
the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942 (1976) 
(discussing the due process requirements for public employees).  
 123 See Fosler, supra note 122, at 400; see also THOM REILLY, RETHINKING PUBLIC SECTOR 
COMPENSATION: WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST? 68 (2012). 
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be more numerous and intangible than goals in private business.124  
Moreover, because employees in the public sector were not concerned with 
competition or profits, few market constraints limited their demands.125 
Mandatory taxes funded government operations, so the government did not 
need to hold the price of its operations down to attract customers.126 
Another important distinction between the public and private 
employment sector related to the hierarchal structure and authority within 
employment.127 Employees in the public sector actively participated in the 
selection of their employers, the elected officials, whereas private sector 
unions did not. Moreover, a distinct authoritative structure in the private 
sector made it easier to identify who was on the other side of the bargaining 
table. In the private sector, the union actively bargained against private 
business owners, the interests of shareholders, and management, whereas in 
the public sector, bargaining sides were more obscure. Elected officials did 
not profit from favorable concessions, and ultimately the interests of 
taxpayers (some of whom were also public employees and union members) 
were impacted by the results.128 Furthermore, scholars early on recognized 
the potential “two bites at the apple” advantage exclusive to public sector 
bargaining employees, where unions could attempt by lobbying to secure 
from elected officials and the legislature that which they failed to obtain at 
the bargaining table.129 
 
 124 Fosler, supra note 122, at 400. 
 125 See REILLY, supra note 123, at 68 (noting that private sector unions know to mitigate their 
demands, or not to “give away the farm” because their employers could go out of business; public 
unions have no such incentive because their industry is not driven by market discipline); see also Harry 
C. Katz et al., Crisis and Recovery in the U.S. Auto Industry: Tumultuous Times for a Collective 
Bargaining Pacesetter, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER DURESS : CASE STUDIES OF MAJOR U.S. 
INDUSTRIES 46, 75–77 (Howard R. Stranger et al. eds., 2013). The UAW, a private union known 
historically as a highly centralized and militant organization that had successfully negotiated generous 
benefits in the past, agreed to large concessions in 2007 and even more in 2009 during the General 
Motors and Chrysler bankruptcies to help the companies stay afloat. James Sherk, How Collective 
Bargaining Affects Government Compensation and Total Spending, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 22, 2015), 
http://www.heritage.org/testimony/how-collective-bargaining-affects-government-compensation-and-
total-spending [https://perma.cc/MVD8-5N3A]. 
 126 See Fosler, supra note 122, at 401. The states’ monopolies on essential services give 
government unions “tremendous leverage to force concessions.” REILLY, supra note 123, at 68. 
 127 See Fosler, supra note 122, at 401. 
 128 Id.; see also REILLY, supra note 123, at 68. 
 129 See HABER, supra note 118, at 9–10. This concept is also referred to in scholarship as “‘end 
run’ or ‘double-deck’ bargaining.” Id. at 9; see also Michael H. Gottesman, Wellington’s Labors, 
45 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 77, 81 (2001). The concern that public labor unions would take “two bites at 
the apple” were valid. At the state level especially, public labor unions have successfully used their 
political lobby to influence public sector employment legislation. Up until quite recently, politicians 
that refused their demands often faced tough reelection campaigns and union opposition. See, e.g., 
Patrice M. Mareschal, Innovation and Adaptation: Contrasting Efforts to Organize Home Care Workers 
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Public and private sector union members also differed in the Due 
Process Clause rights and applicable civil service laws they had in the 
workplace without collective bargaining. Whereas private sector employees 
could be terminated “at will” without an appeal and were presumed to have 
no rights to continued employment without a collective bargaining 
agreement stating differently, due process required minimum procedural 
protections from sudden terminations in the public sector. Far beyond these 
minimal due process protections, state and federal civil services laws also 
protected public sector employees from both arbitrary and partisan 
terminations. 
B. The Internal Evolution: Public Sector Unions and             
“Professional Unionism” 
The number of government employees exploded during the decades 
that followed the first public sector labor laws.130 With this unprecedented 
growth, public sector unions and collective bargaining also grew in size 
and acceptance, with a majority of states adopting collective bargaining 
laws by the end of the 1970s and public sector union density peaking at just 
over 38%.131 The workable alternatives to strikes at impasse—mainly 
mediation and fact-finding—had cultivated a stabilizing image of public 
sector bargaining and for the most part proven its opponents wrong.132 
However, as the public employment sector grew, differences between these 
new public sector union members, the union members of old, and the 
representative models able to effectively aid the two became more 
apparent.133 
The influx of public sector employees caused a dramatic change in 
union membership demographics. Unlike the prototypical private union 
members from the 1950s who were “blue-collar” industrial working white 
 
in Four States, 31 LAB. STUD. 25, 32–33 (2006) (noting that in 2000, SEIU Local 503 was instrumental 
in getting Oregon to pass legislation that created a home-care commission to set the standards for in-
home caregivers and serve as their employer of record). Unions have also lobbied governors to gain 
rights that were not gained at the bargaining table. The efficiency of this design is that it is cheaper and 
easier to convince one person to pass an executive order than persuade the majorities in both houses of 
the legislature to pass similar legislation. See, e.g., 14 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 4945, 4947–49 (Dec. 26, 
2008) (Governor Janet Napolitano awarding public state employees “meet and confer” rights). 
 130 See Tom Juravich & Kate Bronfenbrenner, Preparing for the Worst: Organizing and Staying 
Organized in the Public Sector, in ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 262 
(Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998) (noting that the number of government employees went from 
7.8 million in 1958 to more than 15.7 million in 1978). 
 131 See id. (public sector union density jumping from 10.6% in 1958, to 38.2%in 1977); see also 
Slater, supra note 58, at 518–19. 
 132 See Slater, supra note 58, at 517–18. 
 133 See HABER, supra note 118, at 9. 
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males clad in “hard hats” and “steel-toed boots,” a substantial number of 
public sector union members were “professional” or “white collar” 
employees.134 On average, these public sector professional employees had 
more years of education, were more likely to be female, and reported a 
stronger personal attachment to their jobs and occupational identity than 
conventional private sector union members.135 Moreover, the employment 
values of these professional employees varied significantly from just the 
traditional “bread and butter” terms and conditions of employment that 
dominated private sector collectively-bargained-for contracts.136 Many of 
these professional employees—by virtue of their expertise and intellectual 
training—desired participation in organizational policy and a voice in 
setting professional standards even more than a say in the traditional terms 
and conditions of employment.137 Thus, after obtaining organizing rights, 
they soon rejected the early public sector unions patterned after the private 
sector model, which viewed labor and management interests as conflicting 
 
 134 See HERBERT B. ASHER ET AL., AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS IN THE ELECTORAL ARENA 28, 35 
(2001). Although more than 81% of union members were blue collar in 1952, white collar professional 
workers gained majority status among union members in 1996. By 2015, women made up 46% of union 
membership, despite members being overwhelmingly male in 1952 (85%  male), and African 
Americans and Hispanics now make up a noticeable portion of the union population that was once 
predominately white. Table 1: Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Selected 
Characteristics, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://bls.gov/news.release/union2.t01.htm [https://perma.cc/B5UD-7FKQ]. See also 29 U.S.C. 
§ 152(11)–(12) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). Because many professional employees are also 
supervisors, the exclusion of professionals from private union membership stems in large part from the 
Taft-Hartley amendment excluding “supervisors” from coverage under the NLRA. The Taft-Hartley 
amendment, however, does allow nonsupervisor “professional employee[s]” to self-organize and 
bargain collectively through representatives, and although still low, the rate of unionized professional 
employees in the private sector is slowly increasing. See GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 
UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (2004), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/
key_workplace/174 [https://perma.cc/954X-JH3D]. 
 135 See MAYER, supra note 134; see also GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SELECTED 
CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS (2011), http://govexec.com/pdfs/
071911kl1.pdf [https://perma.cc/89DJ-ULSJ]. The trend of public employees who are union members 
being generally more educated than their private sector union membership continues. In 2003, almost 
three-fourths (73.6%) of union members with a bachelor’s or advanced degree were employed in the 
public sector. See Richard W. Hurd & John Bunge, Unionization of Professional and Technical 
Workers: The Labor Market and Institutional Transformation, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 178, 186 (Richard Freeman et al. eds., 2005). 
 136 David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining By 
Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689, 691 (1990). Collective bargaining agreements are legally 
enforceable contracts that span the course of several years and form the bedrock of the continuing 
employment relationship between labor and management. 
 137 See id.; see also Hurd & Bunge, supra note 135, at 186 (empirical findings show that those 
professionals who choose to engage in “group activity” are most interested in representational 
preferences for professionals, showing that more than wages and benefits, professional employees are 
concerned with having a voice in organizational policies and preserving freedom to exercise 
professional judgment). 
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and the bargaining scope of contractual agreements as restrictive.138 Instead, 
they pushed for representatives who would negotiate collaborative roles in 
professional management and policymaking,139 following a “professional 
unionism” representative model.140 
Even for unions open to this new professional unionism representative 
model, the applicable public sector statutes presented a challenge because 
they had been fashioned after federal labor law in the private sector, which 
was not particularly amenable to employee roles in organizational policy.141 
Federal labor law distinguishes between “mandatory” subjects of 
bargaining (the “bread and butter” wage, hours, and conditions of 
employment issues) from those subjects that are merely “permissive” 
bargaining subjects (all other legal bargaining subjects, including those 
related to organizational policy).142 The assumption that management and 
labor representatives’ interests are inherently adversarial has, in the past, 
made employers in the private sector reluctant to even discuss permissive 
 
 138 See Randall W. Eberts, Teachers Unions and Student Performance: Help or Hindrance?, 
17  FUTURE CHILD. 175, 179 (2007) (explaining professional unions’ desires to move from an 
adversarial model to a more collaborative collective bargaining one where professionals and 
government decisionmakers share common goals and hold joint responsibility); see also Charles Taylor 
Kerchner & Julia E. Koppich, Negotiating What Matters Most: Collective Bargaining and Student 
Achievement, 113 AM. J. ED. 349, 351–52 (2007) (describing how teachers unions worked their way out 
of narrowly constructed bargaining structures to include topics such as professional development and 
educational standards in collective bargaining). 
 139 Some representatives needed less pushing to seek this kind of influence, having their roots as 
professional associations prior to the public sector labor movement anyway. See Sar A. Levitan & 
Frank Gallo, Can Employee Associations Negotiate New Growth?, 112 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 5, 5 
(1989). Note, however, that many professional employees rejected the idea of unionization, believing 
that the principles of collective bargaining were not compatible to the professional values of 
collegiality, autonomy, and individual responsibility. See Henry Mintzberg, A Note on the Unionization 
of Professionals from the Perspective of Organization Theory, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 623, 630–34 (1983); 
see also Sanford H. Kadish et al., The Manifest Unwisdom of the AAUP as a Collective Bargaining 
Agency: A Dissenting View, 58 AAUP BULL. 46, 57–61 (1972) (three dissenting members of the 
governing Council of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) authoring a statement 
staunchly opposed to the AAUP’s recent vote to “pursue collective bargaining as a major additional 
way of realizing the Association’s goals in higher education”). 
 140 See Kerchner & Koppich, supra note 138, at 351–52 (describing Albert Shanker’s use of the 
term “professional unionism” in the mid-1980s during a speech to AFT leaders as the turning point in 
public sector union initiatives). 
 141 See Rabban, supra note 135, at 692–93. 
 142 Id. at 702–04; see also NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349–50 
(1958) (bargaining proposal which “settles no term or condition of employment” does not concern a 
mandatory subject of bargaining); Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Rel. Comm., Inc., 880 F. 
Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995) (mandatory subjects of bargaining 
encompass wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment; permissive subjects of 
bargaining are all other matters). 
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bargaining subjects in the interests of preserving management discretion to 
the utmost extent.143 
Public sector unions, however, have proved immensely successful in 
bargaining over these permissive subjects, particularly as they relate to 
collaborative policy roles for their professional employees.144 Teachers 
unions have been at the forefront of this, negotiating provisions in 
collective bargaining agreements related to the length of school days, 
student–teacher ratios, instructional and preparation time, the use of 
performance indicators, school safety provisions, and professional 
qualifications for hire.145 But teachers are not the only professionals to 
negotiate organizational decisionmaking roles in the public sector. Public 
defenders and legal aid attorneys have also negotiated reduced caseloads 
and adequate space to counsel their clients in privacy.146 Nurses in public 
health institutions have used collective bargaining to maintain adequate 
nurse–patient ratios and staffing provisions.147 And police unions have 
 
 143 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A Call for 
Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 769–71 (2011). For judicial discussions of well-drafted 
“management rights” clauses in collectively bargained for contracts, wherein a union and employer 
unmistakably acknowledge a certain issue as a permissive subject of bargaining and waive their right to 
bargaining over a particular issue, see Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, LLC and United Food 
and Commercial Workers Union, Local 1996, 352 N.L.R.B. 179 (2008), review granted, decision 
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 
469 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 144 See Paul T. Hill, The Costs of Collective Bargaining Agreements and Related District Policies, 
in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION 89, 91–92 (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 
2006) (describing the success teachers’ unions had in shaping school policy through the collective 
bargaining process and permissive bargaining topics).  
 145 See SAUL A. RUBINSTEIN & JOHN E. MCCARTHY, COLLABORATING ON SCHOOL REFORM: 
CREATING UNION-MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIPS TO IMPROVE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS 3–5 (2010); 
JONATHAN ECKERT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., LOCAL LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIPS AS A 
VEHICLE TO ADVANCE REFORM 4 (2011) (describing case studies in which labor–management 
partnerships have contributed to improved student outcomes in a range of areas by facilitating “teacher 
leadership,” which is “essential to dynamic decision-making”). 
 146 See Laura Midwood & Amy Vitacco, Note, The Right of Attorneys to Unionize, Collectively 
Bargain, and Strike: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 299, 308–11 
(2000); see also Lesley Oelsner, 400 Legal Aid Lawyers Go on Strike for Better Pact, N.Y. TIMES, July 
3, 1973, at 1; Tim Leininger, State Public Defenders, Supervisors, Vote to Unionize, J. INQUIRER (Nov. 
16, 2016, 11:15 AM), http://www.journalinquirer.com/connecticut_and_region/state-public-defenders-
supervisors-vote-to-unionize/article_94b20c44-ac01-11e6-a439-6f489d79609a.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZZ38-DS36]. 
 147 See, e.g., Mark Gruenberg, Nurses’ Union Ratifies Contract with Veterans Administration, 
PEOPLE’S WORLD (Oct. 15, 2012, 11:58 AM) http://www.peoplesworld.org/article/nurses-union-
ratifies-contract-with-veterans-administration/ [https://perma.cc/FQE6-5XR4]; Jo Kroeker, Flint Nurse 
Union to Take Hospital to Court, DETROIT NEWS (June 20, 2017, 7:25 PM) 
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/06/20/flint-nurse-pharmacist-union-
hospital-court/103054530/ [https://perma.cc/K5LG-TBJY]. 
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bargained for additional allotted training hours in firearm proficiency and 
medical emergency care.148 
C. The Impact of Widening the Bargaining Scope in the Public Sector 
Widening the typical scope of bargaining topics to influence 
organizational policy was a fundamental early victory for public sector 
unions. That collectively-bargained-for agreements in the public sector still 
generally encompass a broader scope of activities remains a modern 
distinction between public and private sector collective bargaining 
mechanics. Although most state statutes regulating public sector collective 
bargaining also distinguish between permissive and mandatory subjects, 
government officials who bargain on the other side of the table with public 
sector unions have (up until very recently) been more willing to discuss 
permissive topics than private sector employers.149 Unlike in private sector 
bargaining, a combination of social and political pressures made avoidance 
of permissive topics in the public sector unpopular.150 For example, local 
school boards were persuaded to give teachers unions a say in school 
policies or curricula because teachers were the ones actually involved in the 
day-to-day educational process and teachers were, more often than not, also 
their constituents.151 Moreover, to the extent that teachers’ union desires to 
influence permissive bargaining subjects led to an improved education 
system, a school board that refused to bargain appeared to take the 
 
 148 See, e.g., Boston, Patrolmen’s Union Agree to 4-Year, $68 Million Deal, NEWSOK (Feb. 20, 
2017, 5:20 AM), http://newsok.com/boston-patrolmens-union-agree-to-4-year-68-million-
deal/article/feed/1170965 [https://perma.cc/F9NS-6W8K]; Kevin Davis, Police Unions & Officer 
Survival, OFFICER.COM (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.officer.com/article/10635548/police-unions-officer-
survival [https://perma.cc/E6EF-45WU]. 
 149 See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, Collective Bargaining on Issues of Health and Safety in the Public 
Sector: The Experience Under New York’s Taylor Law, 31 BUFF. L REV. 165, 166–68 (1982) (noting 
some of the ways the New York collective bargaining statute urges public employees to bargain over 
permissive subjects without making them mandatory by law). See generally Juravich & 
Bronfenbrenner, supra note 129, at 264–67 (empirical findings suggesting union and collective 
bargaining employer opposition in general is much lower in the public sector). 
 150 See Juravich & Bronfenbrenner, supra note 130, at 269–72. 
 151 See, e.g., Rebecca Klein, New York Teachers Union Says ‘No’ To New Education Standards, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 27, 2017, 7:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/27/ny-teachers-
union-common-core_n_4676465.html [https://perma.cc/34LG-Y5GV]. Teacher union political 
influence is not just amplified by the status of their membership making up part of the electorate who 
elects government officials (many school districts require public school teachers to live in the district 
where they teach). Empirical evidence also suggests that union members are more likely to vote in 
general and primary elections and participate in other political and civil activities. See Jasmine 
Kerrissey & Evan Schofer, Union Membership and Political Participation in the United States, 91 SOC. 
FORCES 895, 905–07 (2013); Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Unions, Voter Turnout, and Class 
Bias in the U.S. Electorate, 1964–2004, 69 J. POL. 430, 441 (2007). 
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universally unpopular political stance of being unwilling to improve 
education. 
Recently, at the urging of labor scholars—who argue that it is both 
good business sense and good social policy—more private sector 
employers have been open to unions facilitating additional employee voice 
into the workplace.152 However, even if the scope of bargaining were to 
widen in the private sector to allow professional employees a voice in 
organizational policy, the impact of the wider bargaining scope would still 
affect the public sector differently.153 That difference lies in the legitimate 
third-party interests in public sector bargaining—the interests of citizens—
in determining public policy.154 
Arguably, a citizen interest exists in even the “bread and butter” 
subjects of collective bargaining in the public sector, to the extent that they 
allocate public resources to one public service over another.155 However, a 
more convincing concern arises when public unions negotiate bargaining 
subjects that affect public policy, circumventing the ordinary legislative 
and administrative processes for determining such issues.156 Again, the 
public education sphere is littered with examples of this, where subjects 
like curricula and class size were decided by teachers unions and school 
boards at the bargaining table, denying parents and community members a 
voice in determining their outcome.157 But teachers unions are not alone in 
bargaining over subjects with major policy implications. 
 
 152 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 143, at 804–09 (suggesting that worker voice in the private sector 
can enhance productivity as on-the-ground employees often have useful insight concerning methods of 
production and that employee voice reduces turnover costs; moreover, promoting employee voice 
promotes social workplace norms, solves the problem of negotiating public goods in the workplace, and 
views workers more as humans than commodities); see, e.g., CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW 
UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING CORPORATION 8–9, 77–81, 224 (1988) 
(arguing that the current legal framework—including exclusive representation, a clear line between 
exempt managers and nonexempt workers, and arbitrary lines between working conditions and 
managerial domain—freezes industrial relations and inhibits needed changes); THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET 
AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 234–36 (1986) (noting that 
innovations in industrial relations “challenge” doctrines of employer domination, exclusive 
representation, distinctions between workers and supervisors, and distinctions among bargaining 
subjects). 
 153 See WELLINGTON & WINTER, JR., supra note 82, at 22 (1971) (arguing that the impact of 
expanding the scope is not only different but also “much more troublesome” in the public sector). 
 154 Id. at 29, 137–42. 
 155 Id. at 17–18. 
 156 Id. at 141–42. 
 157 See id. at 137–38 (observing early collective agreements in New York City and New Haven 
addressing class size in 1963 and 1969); see also Frederick M. Hess & Andrew P. Kelly, Scapegoat, 
Albatross, or What?: The Status Quo in Teacher Collective Bargaining, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN 
EDUCATION: NEGOTIATING CHANGE IN TODAY’S SCHOOLS 53, 82 (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. 
Rotherham eds., 2006); Charles T. Kerchner, Union-Made Teaching: The Effects of Labor Relations on 
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Indeed, police unions also have been besieged by social activist 
groups claiming that bargained-for contract provisions—such as those 
addressing investigations into the use of force or police misconduct— 
shield officers from accountability at the community’s expense.158 Recently 
the City of Chicago illustrated one of the most striking examples of this. 
After a police officer shot seventeen-year-old Laquan McDonald sixteen 
times in the back, the grievance procedure contained in the collectively 
bargained-for police agreement allowed him to remain on the city’s payroll 
for over a year following the incident.159 Other provisions within the 
collective bargaining agreement protected the officer’s identity from the 
public, barred investigators from reviewing his past record of civilian 
complaints, and prevented the city from charging him or any other officers 
involved for the false statements made during the investigation, even 
though a dashboard camera video later proved those statements 
unequivocally false.160 The entire incident prompted Chicago Mayor Rahm 
Emanuel to remark that such collective bargaining agreements have 
“essentially turned the [police] code of silence into official policy.”161 
Renowned legal scholars Harry Wellington and Ralph Winter warned 
of public sector unions’ potential to disproportionately impact the political 
process in the early 1970s, and Justice Powell’s Abood concurrence showed 
remarkable foresight in this area. But the true scope of public sector 
 
Teaching Work, 13 REV. RES. EDUC. 317, 327 (1986). Other states have removed the issue of class size 
from bargaining by addressing it in separate statutory provisions. Florida voters ratified a constitutional 
amendment in 2002 to reduce class sizes to 18 for prekindergarten through Grade 3, 22 for Grades 4 
through 8, and 25 for Grades 9 through 12. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (2002); see also S.J. Res. 2, 112th 
Leg. (Fla. 2010) (joint resolution proposing to amend Article IX, Section 1, of the Florida Constitution 
relating to class sizes, revising language so that maximum and minimum class size requirements apply 
to each school’s class grade average and not every class individually). 
 158 See Conor Friedersdorf, Black Lives Matter Takes Aim at Police-Union Contracts, ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 7, 2015) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/black-lives-matter-takes-aim-at-
police-union-contracts/418530/ [https://perma.cc/N99G-MQH7] (noting that several cities have 
collective bargaining agreements with police unions that require delays before an officer investigated 
for use of force can be interviewed, mandatory paid leave when an officer discharges a weapon, and the 
protection of their identity from the public). 
 159 See Editorial Board, When Police Unions Impede Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2016, at SR8; 
Adeshina Emmanuel, Chicago Police Contract Scrutinized in the Aftermath of Laquan Mcdonald’s 
Death, CHI. REP. (Dec. 10, 2015), http://chicagoreporter.com/chicago-police-contract-scrutinized-in-
the-aftermath-of-laquan-mcdonalds-death/ [https://perma.cc/3LBF-JXZQ]; Nausheen Husain, Laquan 
McDonald Timeline: The Shooting, the Video, and the Fallout, CHI. TRIB. (June 27, 2017, 6:13 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquanmcdonald/ct-graphics-laquan-mcdonald-officers-fired-
timeline-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/H8C7-6TR4]; Agreement Between Fraternal Order of the 
Police Chicago Lodge No. 7 and the City of Chicago (July 1, 2012), https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/5516f090e4b01b711314608f/t/55d0b066e4b0c6285c50236b/1439740006221/Chicago-FOP-
Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q376-ZRMT]. 
 160 Emmanuel, supra note 159. 
 161 Editorial Board, supra note 159. 
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collective bargaining, and the extent of its impact, could not have been 
known.162 In fact, even now in contemporary public workplaces, we only 
know for sure that to the extent union activities influence public policy, 
“[n]othing endures but change.”163 Public sector union activity and 
influence is always shifting, context specific, politically dependent, and 
responsive to technological initiatives. Fortunately, state and local 
lawmakers have proven proficient and flexible cartographers when it comes 
to mapping out the boundaries of collective bargaining to fit the needs of 
their jurisdiction. 
D. The External Evolution: Legislation 
Abood addressed a Michigan public sector collective bargaining 
statute in its earliest form, when it was most similar to the private sector 
federal model.164 Unlike their predecessors, public sector labor laws have 
proven much more tolerant of innovation, existing in a wide variety of 
models today throughout state and local jurisdictions.165 In a genuine 
illustration of states working as laboratories of democracy,166 state 
lawmakers have modified their public sector collective bargaining 
legislation to experiment with and evaluate solutions addressing a variety 
of issues.167 Solutions to issues directly relating to the political nature of 
 
 162 See supra notes 144–48; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223 (1977). 
 163 THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 356 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) (thought to be attributable to 
the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus). 
 164 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 212–14, 222. Like most states, Michigan’s first collective bargaining 
statute was modeled after federal law with many provisions nearly identical to the NLRA and RLA. Id.; 
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 423.201–217 (1979). 
 165 Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector Labor 
Law Spectrum, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 735, 735 (2009); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, The 
Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1531–32 (2002) (describing the 
institutional barriers that have left private sector labor law virtually untouched since the Landrum-
Griffin Act of 1959, much to the frustration of reform advocates). 
 166 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Justice 
Louis Brandeis popularizing the concept of state and local governments as laboratories to enact and test 
new social and economic policies). 
 167 Id.; see also Hodges, supra note 165, at 737–48. For additional experimental efforts in state 
labor legislation, see Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 3500–3511 (West 2001.), as explained in Joseph R. Grodin, 
Public Employee Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts, 23 HASTINGS 
L.J. 719, 720–21, 737 (1972) (California experimenting with a proportional, as opposed to an exclusive 
representation labor statute for public employees from 1961 to 1976), and see also WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 111.70(1)(nc) (1993), repealed by A.B. 75, § 2224, 99th Leg. (Wis. 2009), as explained in Martin 
Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in the Public Sector: A Search for Common Elements, 27 ABA J. LAB. 
& EMP. LAW 149, 151 & n.16 (2012) (discussing Wisconsin’s 1993–2009 experimentation with a 
qualified economic offer (QEO) bargaining prohibition, which preempted bargaining over school 
employee wages if a school district’s wage offer met a prescribed formula). In 2009, Wisconsin 
repealed the QEO. Id. 
112:597 (2018) Reconciling Agency Fee Doctrine 
633 
public sector collective bargaining have already been worked into many 
state and local legal frameworks. These issues include the permission and 
collection methods of agency fees and the scope of bargaining subjects, and 
their resolution is part of an ongoing effort by states to build the most 
responsive model for their jurisdictions. States’ significantly different and 
often-modified public sector collective bargaining statutes now merit 
additional consideration and weight in future litigation. Put another way, 
thanks to states’ flexibility in amending, eliminating, and narrowing their 
public sector collective bargaining regimes over the last few decades, all 
agency fees, their permitting statutory provisions, and the stated 
justifications behind them are not created equal. 
1. Legislative Limits to Collective Bargaining 
To restrict the impact public sector unions had on public policy, states 
began narrowing the scope of public sector collective bargaining subjects 
by statute and judicial interpretation as early as the 1980s.168 Not 
surprisingly, these early exclusions concerned teachers unions and the 
somewhat controversial bargaining topics that related to educational 
initiatives. In 1982, New Jersey made school curriculum, class size, and the 
length of the school day illegal bargaining topics because they were to be 
decided “not by negotiation . . . but by the political process.”169 Kansas,170 
Delaware,171 Maine,172 and Nevada173 soon followed with their own 
excluded bargaining topics for teachers unions. Michigan would amend its 
collective bargaining laws in the 1990s to prohibit teachers unions from 
bargaining over an enumerated list of topics, such as the privatization of 
non-instructional educational services, charter school approval, and the 
starting day of the school term.174 In 2011, Michigan amended its statute 
 
 168 See supra notes 155–62. 
 169 In re Local 195 v. State, 443 A.2d 187, 191 (N.J. 1982). 
 170 S.B. 551, Ch. 167 (Kan. 2002) (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5413(l)(3) (2015)) (making 
school term and school hours not subject to bargaining). 
 171 Colonial Sch. Bd. v. Colonial Affiliate, 449 A.2d 243, 247 (Del. 1982) (topics other than 
“salaries, employee benefits, and working conditions” are prohibited from bargaining). 
 172 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(1)(c) (2014) (excluding “educational policies” from scope 
of bargaining). 
 173 NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.150 (1975) (removing “[a]ppropriate staffing levels and work 
performance standards,” the “quality and quantity” of public services, and “[t]he means and methods of 
offering these services” from the scope of bargaining). 
 174 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 112 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.215 (West 2014)); 
see also Malin, supra note 167, at 151, 159 (noting that twice-elected Michigan governor John Engler 
campaigned forcefully on educational reform initiatives); Benjamin M. Superfine & Jessica J. Gottlieb, 
Teacher Evaluation and Collective Bargaining: The New Frontier of Civil Rights, 2014 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 737, 746–49 (describing how the large-scale education policy reform of the late 1980s and early 
1990s bred a climate that elected John Engler and embraced collective bargaining restraints on teacher 
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again to prohibit teacher union bargaining over, inter alia, teacher 
placements, performance evaluations, and education standards.175 
Instead of listing the excluded bargaining subjects, Idaho and Indiana 
have preferred to limit the scope of teacher union bargaining by listing the 
allowable bargaining subjects within their statutes and expressly 
prohibiting everything else.176 Wisconsin’s collective bargaining statute 
explicitly limits the scope of bargaining for all public sector employees 
(except for police, firefighters, and municipal transit employees) to the 
single issue of “base wages.”177 Other bargaining topics are prohibited.178 
Some states have, for policy reasons, taken away all bargaining rights for 
specific types of public employees, while others have prohibited particular 
bargaining subjects like healthcare across the board.179 
While the state initiatives above exemplify attempts to limit the scope 
of bargaining on policy issues, other states have preserved bargaining rights 
over these same matters by statute or case law, even making some not just 
permissive but mandatory bargaining subjects. Illinois and California, for 
example, have both experimented with “class size” as a mandatory 
bargaining subject for teachers unions and their employers.180 Despite the 
state having a broad scope of bargaining subjects for its public employees, 
California has crafted other alternatives for the public to be heard on 
bargaining matters related to policy. For instance, for some classes of 
 
unions). The igniting spark to such reform was the 1983 report A Nation at Risk. Drafted by the 
National Committee on Educational Excellence, the report viewed America’s educational system as a 
national crisis, noting that: “[T]he educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by 
a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people.” DAVID P. GARDNER 
ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM 13 (1983), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED226006.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JU7M-QNB4]. 
 175 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 103. 
 176 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33.1272 (West 2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-4 to -4.5 (West 2017). 
 177 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.91(3) (West 2017). 
 178 Id. For another interesting state model on regulating the bargaining scope, but still preserving a 
professional element of choice, see the current Kansas statute regarding teacher contract bargaining, 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5423(b)(1) (2015). This statute requires that, along with compensation and the 
required amount of hours, each party may select no more than three additional “terms and conditions of 
professional service” from an enumerated list as mandatory bargaining topics. Id. All other terms and 
conditions not selected are then deemed permissive bargaining topics, only subject to negotiation if the 
parties mutually agree. Id. 
 179 See S.B. 98, § 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6 (Nev. 2011) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.140 
(2011)) (removing bargaining rights from physicians, lawyers, and supervisors); see also MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 32B, § 23(a) (West 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:16-17.1.a. (West 2017) 
 180 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3543.2 (West 2015); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10 (1984); see also Decatur 
Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 536 N.E.2d 743, 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (interpreting 
class size as a mandatory bargaining subject under 115 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10 because class size “directly 
affected terms and conditions of employment”). 
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public employees, their legislative scheme requires that all initial 
bargaining proposals be presented at a public meeting so citizens may 
express their views.181 
2. Legislative Limits to Agency Fees 
 Aside from “right to work” states, which prohibit all agency fee 
agreements in both the private and public sectors, states have limited 
agency fee rights and their influence on political activity through a variety 
of other statutory forms.182 For example, several states have proposed 
“paycheck protection” laws that prohibit the deduction of union dues or 
agency fees from public employee paychecks.183 Alabama, for example, 
tested a statutory prohibition on the political use of any money collected 
through public employee payroll deductions, and Michigan barred the 
payroll deduction of all union dues for only public school teachers.184 
Others have experimented with “opt in” paycheck legislation, which would 
require employees to reauthorize annually if they wish to have union 
dues/agency fees deducted from their paychecks.185 Other proposals have 
required unions to obtain written consent from members in order to deduct 
money from their paychecks for political purposes.186 
 
 181 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3547 (West 2015). 
 182 See Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt & Winston Lin, The Great Recession, the Resulting Budget 
Shortfalls, the 2010 Elections and the Attack on Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the United 
States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 407, 428–31 (2012) (describing the passage of right to work 
legislation from the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947 through 2012). When this Article went to print, 
twenty-eight states were right to work states with Missouri being the last to enact legislation in 
February 2017. Right to Work: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. 
FOUND. (2017), http://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/55DB-
YNZ7]. However, even right to work exists on a spectrum in the laboratory that is state labor law. For 
example, Indiana, which passed right to work legislation in the 1950s and then repealed it in the 1960s, 
is now right to work again as of 2012. Dau-Schmidt & Lin, supra, at 428–31. Moreover, ten states have 
actually included right to work provisions in their constitutions, presumably to make them harder to 
repeal. Id. at 429 n.152. 
 183 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-361.02). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95–98 (2017); VA. 
CODE. ANN. §§ 40.1–57.2 (2017) (although North Carolina and Virginia bar public sector collective 
bargaining, both states allow for the payroll deduction of union dues). 
 184 ALA. CODE § 17-17-5 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-361.02 (2016). The 2010 Alabama 
Act amending Alabama Code § 17-17-5 with payroll deduction prohibitions was enjoined from taking 
effect based on a First Amendment challenge in Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. Bentley, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 
1327–28 (N.D. Ala. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State Superintendent of Educ., 746 F.3d 
1135 (11th Cir. 2014). The Eleventh Circuit narrowed the injunction, however, allowing the law to take 
effect so long as it applied only to dues deductions for electioneering activities. State Superintendent of 
Educ., 746 F.3d at 1153. 
 185 See, e.g., S.B. 5000, 53rd Leg. (Wash. 1993). 
 186 See, e.g., H.R. 1625, § 4, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. (1996); California 
Proposition 226 (June 2, 1998). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
636 
At least two states, New Jersey and Minnesota, have set statutory 
maximums for agency fees as they relate to the full cost of union member 
dues within the same bargaining unit.187 And although California allows for 
agency fee agreements within the public sector, its statute also includes 
provisions allowing for the rescission of such agreements by a majority 
vote of the bargaining unit employees.188 
Comparing the different statutory forms and scopes of state legislative 
collective bargaining and agency fee models demonstrates that states come 
up with their own solutions and create their own boundaries for public 
unions and their political activity. Abood’s bright line, however, displaces 
their working boundaries and legislative efforts. 
E. The External Evolution: Public Perception 
With the early concerns about public sector collective bargaining put 
to rest, public sector unions were widely accepted by the public on both 
sides of the political aisle by the late 1970s. Indeed, Abood marked the 
beginning of a period of unwavering public approval for public sector 
unions, a remarkable feat considering the continued decline of their private 
sector counterparts.189 If unions in the private sector were dominated by 
competition, turbulence, and uncertainty in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 
2000s, public unions by contrast were their secure and stable younger 
siblings. 
Success ushered in more success. With public sector workers able to 
choose unions and enjoy labor relations in a climate largely free from the 
threats and intimidation that were commonplace in the private sector, even 
more public workers lined up for representation.190 This prevailing 
enthusiasm enabled most public sector unions to win certification elections 
by large margins in the ’80s and ’90s, despite running low-intensity 
organizing campaigns.191 Public sector unions’ esteem meant that in 
addition to employers offering little to no opposition to certification, state 
and local officials negotiated favorable deals to preserve their relationships 
with these popular institutions.192 These favorable deals only bolstered the 
 
 187 See MINN. STAT. § 179A.06 (3) (2012) (fair share fees are not to exceed 85% of regular 
membership dues); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.5(b) (West 2002). 
 188 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3515.7(d) (West 2015). 
 189 See Robert Hebdon et al., Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Tumultuous Times, in 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER DURESS: CASE STUDIES OF MAJOR NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRIES 
255, 257 (Howard R. Stranger et al. eds., 2013). Public sector union density remained extraordinarily 
constant from 2001 (36.8%) to 2011 (37.0%). Id. 
 190 See Juravich & Bronfenbrenner, supra note 130, at 262–64, 269. 
 191 Id. at 264–66, 269. 
 192 Id. at 266–68. 
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public sector unions’ claims that they provided a valuable service to their 
membership that was worth the investment.193 
1. The Great Recession 
Public sector unions were not the only ones feeling secure by the mid-
2000s, as prosperity was in full swing throughout the United States.194 
Fueled by historically low interest rates, low unemployment, and accessible 
credit, an unprecedented number of American households became 
homeowners through subprime mortgages.195 High demand caused the 
median home value to skyrocket, and as home values rose, more families 
spent money as if they were wealthier than their true salaries and wages 
suggested.196 As large segments of the population prospered, a “trickle up” 
effect occurred in the budget offices of state and local governments.197 
Amidst budget surpluses fueled by sales and property tax increases, states 
and local governments went on spending sprees—increasing public wages, 
building infrastructure, and even authorizing resident rebates—in lieu of 
saving for a rainy day.198 
 
 193 See Richard W. Hurd & Tamara L. Lee, Public Sector Unions Under Siege: Solidarity in the 
Fight Back, 39 LAB. STUD. J. 9, 11–12, 19 (2014). 
 194 See THOM REILLY, supra note 123, at 3–4 (2012). Of course, private sector unions—which have 
been in decline since the mid 1980s—were one noteworthy exception to the economic prosperity 
experienced in the early 2000s. See MEGAN DUNN & JAMES WALKER, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, UNION MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2016), 
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016/union-membership-in-the-united-states/pdf/union-membership-in-
the-united-states.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2EQ-QS63]. 
 195 KATALINA M. BIANCO, THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE 
MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 1, 6 (2008) https://business.cch.com/images/banner/subprime.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2YRW-MJM5]. See generally NEVA GOODWIN ET AL., MACROECONOMICS IN 
CONTEXT ch. 15 (2nd ed. 2017) (providing background on the “Financial Crisis and the Great 
Recession”). A subprime mortgage is a type of high interest or adjustable interest mortgage issued to 
borrowers with low credit ratings. They are issued to individuals who do not qualify for a conventional 
mortgage because of their high risk of default. Between 1996 and 2006, the national share of subprime 
mortgage to total mortgage originations increased from nine percent to twenty percent. BIANCO, supra, 
at 6. 
 196 See Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the Resulting 
Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 125–26 (2009). After the housing bubble 
inflated home values, homeowners—believing that their home’s value would continue to increase as it 
had every year in the past since the Great Depression—withdrew high amounts of equity out of their 
newly valued home to spend. Id. at 126–27. In 1996, former Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan 
famously called this phenomenon “irrational exuberance.” Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve of 
the U.S., The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society, Remarks at the Annual Dinner 
and Francis Boyer Lecture of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Dec. 5, 
1996), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm 
[https://perma.cc/643C-YEYZ]. 
 197 See REILLY, supra note 123, at 4. 
 198 “States predominantly tax income and sales, while localities depend primarily on property 
taxes.” Tracy Gordon, State and Local Budgets and the Great Recession, BROOKINGS (Dec. 31, 2012), 
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But in 2007, the United States housing market collapsed under a slew 
of high-risk subprime mortgages that went unpaid. Knee-deep in defaulting 
loans, many banks and lending institutions panicked and tried to quickly 
sell off bad mortgages on Wall Street as cheaply as possible.199 Moreover, 
banks, now paralyzed by their toxic assets and looking to hoard cash, 
stopped lending, causing a credit crisis that effectively froze the American 
economy and began a countrywide recession.200 The recession lasted 
officially from December 2007 through June 2009, and its impact was felt 
so universally throughout the American economy that modern economists 
now refer to it as just the “Great Recession.”201 
2. After the Great Recession 
After the Great Recession, federal and state government deficits 
surged as tax revenues fell to historic lows and demands for public 
programs rose.202 Although Congress initially helped offset states’ longterm 
budgeting gaps with unprecedented fiscal relief in the form of the $787 
billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), the 
problem only intensified in fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012 as ARRA 
funds dried up.203 Thus, faced with impending budgeting shortfalls, states 
 
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/state-and-local-budgets-and-the-great-recession/ 
[https://perma.cc/5QGT-7K34]; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE 
EXPENDITURE REPORT 61, 64 (2011); REILLY, supra note 193, at 4 (noting that Utah approved a $1 
billion long-term road and highway plan during this prosperous period, while the Nevada state 
legislature in 2005 actually approved a rebate to every Nevada resident who owned a vehicle, after the 
state’s gas tax helped produce a $300 million state surplus).  
 199 See Manav Tanneeru, How a ‘Perfect Storm’ Led to the Economic Crisis, CNN (Jan. 29, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/01/29/economic.crisis.explainer/index.html [https://perma.cc/MWC9-
ZHFA]. 
 200 See Holt, supra note 196, at 125. 
 201 See Paul Krugman, Opinion, The Great Recession Versus the Great Depression, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 20, 2009, 4:35 PM), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/the-great-recession-versus-
the-great-depression [https://perma.cc/6N3M-BC7N] (Krugman, a Nobel Prize-winning economist and 
New York Times columnist, labeling the recent crisis as the “Great Recession”). For this paper, the 
author refers to the period of recession following the mortgage and financial crisis as the “Great 
Recession.” See REILLY, supra note 123, at 5–6. At its worst, unemployment would rise to 10.1% as 
more than 14 million people found themselves out of work, and America’s household net worth would 
fall from $66 trillion to $49 trillion. Moreover, more than 3.5 million homes would be returned to the 
banks who financed their mortgage. Id. at 5. 
 202 See Gordon, supra note 198, at 4 (citing to the U.S. Census Bureau figures). State and local 
revenues fell during the Great Recession after sales taxes, income taxes, and property taxes plummeted. 
Id. At their lowest, in 2009 state taxes were down 17% from where they were one year before. Id. 
During these revenue declines, spending pressures—specifically in the form of increased enrollments 
for Medicaid, unemployment insurance, and higher education—increased. Id. 
 203 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553(a)(1), 
123 Stat. 115, 297 (2009); see also Edward Ashbee, The Obama Administration, the Promise of 
Reform, and the Role of Business Interests, in ISSUES IN AMERICAN POLITICS POLARIZED POLITICS IN 
THE AGE OF OBAMA 57, 62 (John Dumbrell ed., 2013); Gordon, supra note 198, at 7. 
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cut spending on education, healthcare, and social services; raised fees 
related to businesses, court access, and higher education; and negotiated 
significant concessions in their employee collective bargaining 
agreements.204 Other states raised taxes to balance their budgets in spite of 
strong opposition from a beaten-down constituency.205 
Myriad voters in economic distress were the perfect amplifiers for 
conservative Republican songs of government being too large and 
expensive. Thus, despite President Barack Obama’s victory in 2008, the 
Great Recession and the country’s slow economic recovery brought forth a 
political shift during the 2010 midterm elections.206 Many voters now 
perceived state governments’ overspending as an “ideological overreach” 
and, in response, delivered significant election victories to Republican 
candidates—specifically Tea Party-aligned candidates—who promised 
smaller government and lower taxes.207 The Democratic Party’s shellacking 
in 2010 gave control of the House to Republicans, who also claimed six 
new seats in the Senate.208 At the state level, the losses proved to be even 
greater as Republicans took complete control of twenty states after winning 
eleven new governorships and eighteen additional state legislatures.209 
Republicans’ new control of both legislative and executive branches at 
the state level set the stage for a startlingly coordinated national campaign 
 
 204 See REILLY, supra note 123, at 6–7. 
 205 See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Californians Back Taxes to Avoid Education Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/in-california-voters-approve-ballot-
measure-that-raises-taxesin-california-approve-voters-ballot-measure-that-raises-
taxes.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%253 
[https://perma.cc/L94M-S4QN] ; THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, AN INCREASE IN PROPERTY AND 
SALES TAX REVENUE HELPED NEW YORK BOUNCE BACK FROM THE GREAT RECESSION (2013), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2013/11/11/new_york_profile.pdf?la=it 
[https://perma.cc/EU36-VBLU] (describing the property and sales tax increases in California and New 
York during the Great Recession). 
 206 See Paul Harris & Ewen MacAskill, US Midterm Election Results Herald New Political Era as 
Republicans Take House, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2010, 12:22 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2010/nov/03/us-midterm-election-results-tea-party [https://perma.cc/55WU-HSS7]. 
 207 See Larry M. Bartels, Political Effects of the Great Recession 12 (Vanderbilt Univ. Center for 
the Study of Democratic Insts., Working Paper No. 6-2013, 2013), http://www.vanderbilt.edu/
csdi/research/CSDI_WP_06-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HK4-MYYB]; see also THEDA SKOCPOL & 
VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE REMAKING OF REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM 4 
(2012). 
 208 See Bartels, supra note 207, at 12. 
 209 See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2010 STATE AND LEGISLATIVE PARTISAN 
COMPOSITION (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/LegisControl_2010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AG4L-YQ7R]; cf. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2011 STATE AND 
LEGISLATIVE PARTISAN COMPOSITION (2011), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/ 
LegisControl_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TVB-ZX6T] (illustrating the over 700 seats lost by 
Democrats in state legislatures during the 2010 midterm election). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
640 
against big government, the “privileged” public worker, and the public 
sector unions that sustained them.210 With help from conservative editorials 
and free market special interests groups like the American Legislative 
Exchange Council (ALEC) and the Mackinac Center, Republican 
lawmakers made public union workers—and their salaries, benefits, and 
pension costs—the scapegoats for high taxes and state budget deficits.211 
These groups proved dramatically successful in changing the fifty-year-old 
narrative of the humble, modest-living public servant into an “elite class” 
of public pension millionaires, siphoning public resources and opposing 
privatization and progressive change.212 
Armed with this new narrative of the overcompensated public worker 
and a library of predrafted legislation, lawmakers got to work, fervently 
introducing legislation to weaken public sector collective bargaining in 
2011. Over the next two years, 733 bills in 42 states relating to public 
employee unions were introduced, and 21 states would pass some form of 
 
 210 See Hurd & Lee, supra note 193, at 14; see also Monica Davey, One-Party Control Opens 
States to Partisan Rush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2012, at A1 (noting that state legislatures have become 
more partisan on both ends of the political spectrum, enabling activists to push through their agendas). 
In 2013, a single party maintained complete government control over more state governments (thirty-
seven) than any other time within the last sixty years. See Davey, supra. “Complete government 
control” within this context refers to one party holding the governor’s office and majorities in both 
legislative chambers. 
 211 See JASON STEIN & PATRICK MARLEY, MORE THAN THEY BARGAINED FOR 39–41 (2013). 
ALEC is a membership organization comprised of state legislators and corporations for the purpose of 
drafting free market model legislation. Although it brands itself as a “nonpartisan” partnership between 
officials and leaders in commerce, the “partnership”—which includes inter alia corporate members 
Exxon Mobil, Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Wal-Mart, Phillip Morris, and Koch Industries—has been 
criticized by some for its ties to other well-known conservative donors and think tanks like the Bradley 
Foundation, the Heritage Foundation, Goldwater Institute, and the Mackinac Center for Public Policy. 
Id. at 40–41. The Mackinac Center is the largest think tank devoted to state-level policies. Its 
contributions to the events in Wisconsin are noteworthy in discussing the change in public perception 
because they are considered the experts in constructing favorable narratives of right-wing objectives. 
Mackinac Center Vice President and former research scholar Joseph P. Overton invented the concept of 
the Overton Window, which describes policy positions that are acceptable to the public. “Shifting the 
window” is the process of making previously unthinkable positions appear acceptable or vice versa. See 
Joseph Lehman, The Overton Window: A Model of Policy Change, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow [https://perma.cc/DR7V-
4W9V]. 
 212 See, e.g., Andrew Biggs & Jason Richwine, The Public Worker Gravy Train, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
24, 2011, at A15; Tim Pawlenty, Government Unions vs. Taxpayers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2010, at 
A19; The Government Pay Boom, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2010, at A18; Andrew G. Biggs, How to 
Become a (Public Pension) Millionaire; In Five States, an Average Full-Career Retiree Receives a 
Retirement Income Higher than His Final Salary, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/andrew-biggs-how-to-become-a-public-pension-millionaire-1394834779 
[https://perma.cc/R7BR-4XRM]. But see Jeffrey H. Keefe, State and Local Public Employees: Are They 
Overcompensated?, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 239 (2012) (data analyses indicating that the total 
compensation package of state and local public employees—when controlled for factors like education 
and experience—is on average 3.7% less than similar employees in the private sector). 
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legislation limiting public sector collective bargaining.213 Because the 
media covered many of these attempts extensively, and they have since 
been the topic of admirable scholarly works, this Article relies on prior 
scholarly contributions and does not review all of these attacks in detail.214 
It will instead focus on two particularly poignant moments that encapsulate 
the shifting public opinion of public sector collective bargaining after 2010. 
3. Wisconsin and New Jersey 
The first was a confrontation between New Jersey Governor Chris 
Christie and an elementary school art teacher, Marie Corfield. After cutting 
into state aid for education, laying off teachers, and using some disdainful 
words to describe New Jersey’s public education system, the new Governor 
held a town hall meeting, which Ms. Corfield attended.215 During their 
interaction, which was captured on video, Ms. Corfield timidly asked the 
Governor how his reforms will help the middle class when “so many 
middle-class teachers are spending tons of money out of their pocket to 
supplement the budgets that were cut so they can buy supplies.”216 
Governor Christie’s responded dismissively to her claims that she “would 
have a hard time paying her bills” after the cuts, his demeanor aggressive 
as he accused Ms. Corfield of showmanship and his tone pugnaciousness 
and filled with contempt as he defended his “lambasting” of New Jersey’s 
teachers union.217 However, if one were to guess which person received a 
stream of abusive emails and Facebook postings in response to the video, 
 
 213 See Dau-Schmidt & Lin, supra note 182, at 413 (observing that of these twenty-one states, 
twelve of them—Wisconsin, Ohio, Indiana, Arizona, Idaho, Michigan, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming—passed “significant restrictions on public sector 
collective bargaining”). ALEC highlighted several model bills designed to limit public sector collective 
bargaining at its biannual Task Force Summit in December 2010. These model bills were introduced in 
several state legislatures, nearly unaltered, over the next two years. STEIN & MARLEY, supra note 211, 
at 39. 
 214 See generally Dau-Schmidt & Lin, supra note 182; Martin H. Malin, Life After Act 10?: Is 
There a Future for Collective Representation of Wisconsin Public Employees?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 623 
(2012); Martin H. Malin, Sifting Through the Wreckage of the Tsunami that Hit Public Sector 
Collective Bargaining, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 533 (2012); Malin, supra note 167; Slater, supra 
note 58; Bryan J. Soukup, From Coolidge to Christie: Historical Antecedents of Current Government 
Officials Dealing with Public Sector Labor Unions, 64 LAB. L.J. 177 (2013).  
 215 See, e.g., Amanda Carey, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie Blasts Teachers’ Unions (Again) 
in Washington, D.C. Speech, DAILY CALLER (Jan. 1, 2010, 1:24 AM), http://dailycaller.com/ 
2010/12/01/new-jersey-governor-chris-christie-blasts-teachers-unions-again-in-washington-d-c-speech/ 
[https://perma.cc/P6YY-8Z34]. 
 216 See GovChristie, Governor Christie Responds to Teacher During Town Hall, YOUTUBE (Sept. 
8, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkuTm-ON904 [https://perma.cc/R9TT-SW3B]. This 
video went viral after Governor Christie’s staff shared it on his website. To date, it has been viewed 
almost 1.5 million times. Id.  
 217 Id. 
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and which one was celebrated as a YouTube sensation, one would probably 
be wrong. Conservatives praised the New Jersey governor and school 
choice advocate for taking on his state’s obstinate public sector unions.218 
The elementary school art teacher got hate mail.219 
The second example of the public shift was Wisconsin’s enactment of 
Act 10. While adequate prior coverage does not require this Article to 
recall the collective bargaining restrictions in Act 10, the protestors 
sleeping on the capitol floors, and the subsequent recall, what should be 
reiterated is that all of this happened in Wisconsin. Once the model 
progressive state for workers’ rights and employee relations, Wisconsin 
was the first state to pass workers compensation legislation; the first to 
enact unemployment insurance laws; the birthplace of the American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME); and 
one of the first three states to bar employment discrimination based on race, 
creed, and national origin.220 Of course, all of these accomplishments paled 
in comparison to being the first state to enact comprehensive collective 
bargaining legislation for the public sector.221 Wisconsin led the nation in 
progressive working trends in the early twentieth century, and the Badger 
State’s models tended to end up all over the country.222 Thus, if Act 10 
could desecrate collective bargaining rights in Wisconsin, many believed 
that collective bargaining rights were vulnerable everywhere. Even 
collective bargaining’s staunchest supporters were left wondering: if 
Wisconsin was again acting as a harbinger for the nation, was the American 
labor movement fated to collapse? 
Few issues are more partisan now than public sector collective 
bargaining rights. So much so that some public sector unions have been 
forced to become more political just to shield themselves from right-wing 
conservative attacks. While public unions are certainly hard to paint as true 
“victims” in the American labor scheme, it is important to note that much 
 
 218 See, e.g., April Girouard, Christie Embraces YouTube Stardom, FOX NEWS (Nov. 29, 2010), 
ttp://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/11/29/christie-embraces-youtube-stardom.html 
[https://perma.cc/AL4F-GQWX]; Richard Pérez-Peña, Talking Tough and Drawing Viewers, New 
Jersey’s Governor Is a YouTube Star, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at A26.  
 219 David A. Fahrenthold, Getting Chris Christie’s Goat: Activists Try to Rile Up Governor, Pile 
Up Some YouTube Hits, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/getting-chris-christies-goat-activists-try-to-rile-up-governor-pile-up-some-youtube-hits/2014/
12/20/c1f4c29e-865d-11e4-9534-f79a23c40e6c_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q75L-KYX3]. 
 220 See STEIN & MARLEY, supra note 211, at 64–66. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
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of their modern political activity may be reactionary.223 As such, agency fee 
opponents who criticize public sector unions in the courts for their 
reactionary political activities may be unjustly blaming the victim. 
Moreover, public unions find themselves in a unique “catch-22” if they are 
under fervent partisan attack and any response dooms their primary source 
of support in a legal challenge because their responsive activities are too 
political. For this reason, a modern and fair balancing of public union 
interests and activities in any First Amendment analysis is paramount to 
their future survival. 
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S EVOLUTION AFTER ABOOD 
Abood also marked the beginning of a transformative period for the 
Supreme Court in First Amendment jurisprudence. Before the late 1970s, 
financial contributions were not “speech,” associations had no expressive 
rights, campaign finance law as we now know it did not exist, and First 
Amendment principles in all forms were understood to be context specific 
and conditional. But beginning with Buckley and picking up speed in the 
2000s, the Court has substantially modified First Amendment doctrine, 
protecting expression in more depth and expounding upon its interrelated 
association and expression principles.224 Some of these changes have 
aligned with the reasoning in Abood and other agency fee cases more than 
others, justifiably producing scholarly criticisms of modern First 
Amendment jurisprudence as “remarkably erratic and fragmented.”225 
 
 223 See, e.g., Matea Gold & Melanie Mason, Labor Unions Rethinking Their Role in Politics, L.A. 
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/10/nation/la-na-labor-endorse-20120311 
[https://perma.cc/85NK-8H6G]. 
 224 See generally Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts Court, the First 
Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409 (2013) (noting a post-Chaplinsky 
resurgence by the Roberts Court recognizing categorical First Amendment exceptions and protections, 
which the author terms “new absolutism,” wherein certain types of speech are absolutely protected 
while other categories are per se unprotected speech); G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the 
Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 391 (1992) 
(tracing the evolution of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s First Amendment interpretations, from his 
early common law influences and “clear and present danger” formula, to his later role as the “founder of 
modern First Amendment jurisprudence” with his speech-protective positions recognizing free speech 
as a central constitutional right). 
 225 Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a 
Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 251 (2004). 
Although McDonald’s quote relates to newsgathering cases, his criticism is common regarding other 
types of First Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan & Robert C. Post, Colloquy, 
It’s What’s for Lunch: Nectarines, Mushrooms, and Beef—The First Amendment and Compelled 
Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 359, 365–67 (2007) (describing “doctrinal instability and 
incoherence” in compelled-subsidy doctrine). 
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As discussed in Part I and explained further below, agency fee 
doctrine touches on First Amendment principles relating to one’s right to 
associate (or not to associate) with members of an organization for 
expressive purposes. But the extent to which this expressive association is 
protected—and how courts reconcile this relationship with the new 
expressive rights of the association itself—is still unclear. Agency fee 
doctrine may also relate to not having to speak, or sponsor another’s 
speech, against one’s will. But surely not all forced payments can be 
compelled speech, or else one may have a First Amendment right not to 
pay taxes or at least be entitled to a pro rata refund for taxes that support 
government initiatives with which one disagrees. 
This Section examines First Amendment cases since Buckley and 
Abood in an attempt to flesh out how the concerns they raised work in other 
contexts and to identify doctrinal commonalities. 
A. Compelled Contributions as Compelled Speech in Campaign Finance 
As mentioned above in Part I, following Buckley, the Supreme Court 
in Abood extended First Amendment coverage to agency fees paid to a 
union for collective bargaining and contract-related expenses.226 Since then, 
the Court’s entire agency fee jurisprudence up through and including 
Harris and Knox has insisted that the payment of all agency fees is 
expressive, despite scholarly arguments and a slew of other compelled 
contribution cases to the contrary.227 
1. Buckley Revisited with an Emphasis on Contributions’ Expressive 
Purpose and Abood 
The Court’s bedrock decision in Buckley v. Valeo was that financial 
contributions, made for the purpose of spreading a political message, are 
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.228 Buckley’s impact 
on political campaigns over time cannot be overstated.229 However, when 
Abood was decided just a year later, Buckley’s doctrinal significance was 
unknown and its reasoning untested. At times, the Abood Court’s 
 
 226 See supra Section I.B.1. 
 227 See generally Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional 
Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 3, 14–15 (1983) (describing the Court’s 
inappropriate acceptance of the extension of the First Amendment doctrine to forced monetary 
contributions). 
 228 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam). 
 229 See TOOBIN, supra note 74, at 150 (observing that the decision in Buckley was so significant 
that it practically “created an entirely new area of law,” as campaign finance regulation was born out of 
the federal government’s and states’ frantic reconstruction of spending and contribution limits in 
response to its elusive guidance). 
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inexperience with Buckley’s newly crafted doctrine is apparent. For 
instance, the Court in Abood correctly relied on Buckley for the principle 
that contributions in support of a cause may be expressive and that 
restricting these contributions may infringe on a contributor’s First 
Amendment rights.230 But it lost sight of Buckley’s primary reasoning when 
it concluded that compelled contributions are the corollary expressive 
infringement to restrictions on contributions.231 The key inference in 
Buckley was that voluntary political contributions were expressive because 
the contributor intended the contribution as “support of an ideological 
cause.”232 As such, compelled payments of any kind lose their expressive 
aspect because they are mandatory, irrespective of a person’s intent or 
endorsement.233 Although the Court misinterpreted the expressive notion of 
forced agency fees in Abood, it has insisted on interpreting them as 
expressive ever since. 
Despite the Abood Court’s dubious reliance on Buckley for its holding 
that compelled political contributions are expressive, Buckley and its 
campaign finance descendants are still important features to any future 
agency fee analysis because of the distinctions they draw between “pure 
political speech” and expressive contributions.234 Unlike political 
expenditures—which Buckley viewed as essentially speech itself, invoking 
strict or exacting scrutiny analysis—Buckley distinguished expressive 
contributions as something less:235 an expressive or “symbolic act” that 
triggered a lesser level of scrutiny.236 
 
 230 See 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977). 
 231 See id. at 234 (“The fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather than prohibited from 
making, contributions for political purposes works no less an infringement of their constitutional 
rights.” (footnote omitted)). 
 232 Id. at 235. 
 233 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. 
 234 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 353 (2003); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–23. 
 235 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66. The standard established in Buckley and applied to political 
expenditures was one of “exacting scrutiny.” Id. at 64. The Buckley Court, however, did not spell out 
exactly what this “exacting scrutiny” meant, and referred to its exacting scrutiny analysis as “strict,” 
using other strict scrutiny language. Id. at 66. Thus, the exacting scrutiny standard has been described 
more recently as being akin to strict scrutiny or perhaps lesser to an insignificant legal extent. See, e.g., 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010) (explaining that the exacting scrutiny test 
requires a “‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest” and a ‘substantial relation’ between the 
disclosure requirement and that interest (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66)). “Under exacting 
scrutiny, the [g]overnment may regulate protected speech only if such regulation promotes a compelling 
interest and is the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.” McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. 
Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014) (citing Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). 
 236 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. 
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2. Modern Campaign Finance Decisions Expand on the Lesser Level 
of Scrutiny—“Closely Drawn Scrutiny” 
In more recent campaign finance decisions, the Court has expanded 
upon the “less rigorous” level of scrutiny for political contributions Buckley 
alluded to.237 In articulating this lesser standard, the Court has recognized 
an expressive nature in contributions but, like Buckley, derived their 
communicative value mainly from their symbolic support and facilitation 
of the recipient’s expression, appraising it as less poignant than political 
expression of the donor herself.238 As such, to satisfy the closely drawn 
scrutiny test today, the government must demonstrate that its actions 
further “a sufficiently important interest” and use methods that are “closely 
drawn” to avoid unnecessary restrictions of First Amendment freedoms.239 
Both the sufficiently important interest prong and the closely drawn prong 
of this scrutiny standard are less rigorous than the compelling interest and 
narrowly tailored/least restrictive requirements of strict and exacting 
scrutiny. But the question is: how much less? 
In 2003, McConnell v. FEC challenged statutory limitations on 
political contributions based on a government interest in eliminating quid 
pro quo corruption.240 McConnell’s application of closely drawn scrutiny is 
illustrative. The plaintiffs in McConnell argued that because the record was 
void of any evidence of instances of quid pro quo corruption, where “a 
federal officeholder has actually switched a vote” in exchange for soft 
money, Congress had failed to demonstrate a closely drawn sufficient state 
interest.241 The Court, however, disagreed, opting instead for a broader 
understanding of the relevant government interest in preventing corruption 
and a looser fitting of the law to the government’s goal.242 The McConnell 
Court broadened the government interests from just preventing quid pro 
quo corruption (that according to the record did not exist) to include 
preventing the appearance of corruption, corruption more generally, or the 
“privileged access to and pernicious influence upon elected 
 
 237 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434; McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2001). 
 238 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444–45; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 94; see also Brief of Petitioner-
Appellant at 30, McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (No. 12-536). Particularly illustrative of the expressive 
nature of contributions, named plaintiff Shaun McCutcheon wished to make several $1,776 donations to 
political causes and candidates that shared his values and approaches to public governance. Brief of 
Petitioner-Appellant, supra, at 30. The precise donation amount (i.e., $1776) was obviously chosen as a 
meaningful form of symbolism in itself. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–21 (noting that limits on political 
contributions are only a “marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free 
communication”). 
 239 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445–46; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 94–96. 
 240 540 U.S. at 95. 
 241 Id. at 149. 
 242 Id. 
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representatives.”243 Under closely drawn scrutiny, McConnell also 
permitted government regulations to prevent corruption, even when those 
regulations were not finely tuned to accomplish that interest and involved a 
“significant interference” with First Amendment rights.244 The McConnell 
Court noted further that closely drawn scrutiny is flexible enough for courts 
to show “proper deference to Congress’ ability to weigh competing 
constitutional interests in an area [such as campaign finance law] in which 
it enjoys particular expertise.”245 Three years later in Randall v. Sorrell, the 
Court described this weighing of interests when reviewing contribution 
limitations as a balancing test, where courts must uphold limitations that 
further an important state interest but strike down limitations that unduly 
inhibit the political process.246 
Most recently, campaign finance decisions have adopted the more 
confined quid pro quo definition of corruption for supporting government 
interests but preserved the lower level of “closely drawn” judicial scrutiny 
for political contributions.247 McCutcheon v. FEC clarified that strict and 
exacting scrutiny (which applies to political speech and expenditures) 
requires a searching review that pays close attention to the “fit” between 
the asserted government interest and governments’ policy choices. On the 
other hand, the “fit” between the government interest and governments’ 
policy choices in closely drawn scrutiny (which applies to political 
contributions) need not be as close. 
Taken together, recent campaign finance decisions articulate how to 
employ Buckley’s less demanding closely drawn scrutiny standard today. 
Courts analyzing the government’s chosen means with the closely drawn 
standard are prepared to uphold laws and regulations that further a 
government interest, even if the regulation is a not a near-perfect fit for that 
 
 243 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1469 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 244 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136. 
 245 Id. at 137–38. 
 246 See 548 U.S. 230, 247–48 (2006) (explaining that “closely drawn” scrutiny requires the courts 
to determine whether contribution limits are so low that they burden the political process). In addition to 
Randall, the Supreme Court expressly declined to overrule Buckley’s distinction between independent 
expenditures and campaign contributions—and their scrutiny standards—in Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010). That the Court declined to overrule the Buckley framework in Citizens United is 
significant because the Citizens United decision was a landmark case in which the Court not only struck 
down portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 but also reversed its own precedent of 
allowing restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity. Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 319, 365–66. Because it already represented an upheaval of campaign finance law, Citizens 
United would have been the perfect opportunity to overturn Buckley, had the Court wanted to. 
 247 Eleven years after McConnell, McCutcheon clarified that the “corruption” of Buckley is limited 
to quid pro quo corruption and not a broader understanding of political equality or the need to ensure 
broader political participation. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 241–42. 
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government interest. By not requiring a perfectly tailored fit, closely drawn 
scrutiny by implication suggests a regulation may be somewhat 
overinclusive or underinclusive and still pass constitutional muster. Finally, 
closely drawn scrutiny is flexible enough to allow judicial deference to 
legislative expertise. 
B. Compelled Third-Party Payments in Other Areas of the Law 
To be sure, even the Abood Court would concede that not all 
compelled contributions are compelled expression and not all compelled 
contributions of others’ expression violate the First Amendment. Justice 
Byron White pointed out as much in his separate opinion in Buckley, 
reasoning that a belief otherwise would prove to be “entirely too much.”248 
Moreover, the government enacts laws and regulatory schemes that compel 
payments or subsidies that are not constitutionally questionable, regardless 
of whether the payer agrees with their use.249 At the heart of this recognition 
are government-imposed taxes, which routinely compel individuals to 
make payments, even in support of government initiatives, services, or 
speech that they oppose.250 Paying taxes, however, is not expressive, even 
when government organizations use them to fund speech activities in 
furtherance of their legitimate regulatory purpose because the speech is 
attributed to the government as “government speech” and not an expressive 
endorsement by the individual taxpayers. Catherine Fisk and Margaux 
Poueymirou provide the apt example of a death penalty opponent who pays 
her taxes knowing some part of them will be used by prosecutors to 
advocate for the death penalty.251 By paying her taxes, she is not endorsing 
the death penalty and no one would associate her with the prosecutor’s 
speech made on behalf of the state.252 
In addition to government speech, the government may also delegate 
regulatory functions to private third parties and compel individuals to 
subsidize their activities without implicating the First Amendment. When 
the third party engages in political speech, the constitutional issue is more 
complicated than pure government speech. The following Section examines 
lines of cases where government-compelled payments to a third party are 
 
 248 424 U.S. 1, 262 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 249 Id. at 262–63. 
 250 See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–59 (1982) (noting that the Social Security system 
could not function if individuals were allowed to challenge Social Security payments because they were 
spent in a manner that went against their beliefs). 
 251 Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of 
Compelled Speech, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439, 462 (2014). 
 252 See id. 
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and are not considered expressive. As the larger framework of this Article 
advocates, such payments are constitutional when part of a larger 
appropriate regulatory scheme or comprehensive government initiative. 
The Court has focused on the regulatory purpose behind compelled 
payments to a third party in a series of cases addressing agricultural-
subsidy programs. In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., the Court 
upheld a regulatory program that, among other things, required California 
fruit growers to contribute money to pay for general advertisements.253 Just 
four years after Glickman, however, the Court struck down a similar 
requirement that mushroom farmers contribute to advertisements in United 
States v. United Foods, Inc.254 In United Foods, the Court distinguished the 
mushroom subsidies from the subsidies in Glickman because they were not 
part of a larger regulatory purpose, independent of the speech itself.255 In 
other words, the regulation creating the Mushroom Council and compelling 
the subsidies was for the exclusive purpose of advertisement (or 
expression), whereas in Glickman, “the mandated assessments for speech 
were ancillary to a more comprehensive [regulatory] program.”256 
As illustrated in Glickman and United Foods, the government may, 
through legislation, delegate authority to a private entity and require 
individuals to pay those private-entity activities that are reasonably 
necessary to the delegated regulatory purpose. The Court has reaffirmed its 
authority to do this in a series of professional bar association cases where 
the government compels membership as part of granting access to a chosen 
profession. In Keller v. State Bar of California, the Court said that the bar 
could use compulsory dues only if the dues were “reasonably incurred for 
the purpose of regulating the legal profession or ‘improving the quality of 
the legal service available to the people of the State.’”257 Like Abood, Keller 
granted a pro rata dues refund to members who objected to the bar’s 
political or ideological expenditures.258 
In sharp contrast to Abood and Keller’s refund requirements, the Court 
upheld mandatory student activity fees at public universities in Board of 
Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth.259 In 
Southworth, the Court unanimously upheld the permissibility of requiring 
 
 253 521 U.S. 457, 460, 476–77 (1997). 
 254 533 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2001). 
 255 Id. at 414–16. 
 256 Id. at 411. 
 257 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 258 Id. at 16–17 (adopting “Abood obligation[s]”—meaning objecting payers were entitled to a 
refund of the bar association’s political expenses—as sufficient protections for bar dues objectors). 
 259 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
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college students to pay money each semester to a fund that subsidized 
student activities, part of which was given to groups with which they 
disagreed.260 Although the plaintiffs argued that under Abood and Keller 
this violated their First Amendment rights and that they were entitled to a 
pro rata refund for the political and ideological activities with which they 
disagreed, the Supreme Court rejected their claim.261 In doing so, the Court 
recognized that mandatory subsidies of objectionable speech infringed on 
students’ First Amendment rights, but it also recognized the “important and 
substantial purpose[]” of student activity fees and “facilitat[ing] a wide 
range of speech.”262 Therefore, on balance, student activity fees passed 
constitutional muster without refunding students for objectionable 
expenditures.263 The Southworth Court, however, in reasoning that the 
university must provide some protection to its students’ First Amendment 
interests, concluded that the university must allocate funding support in a 
viewpoint-neutral manner.264 
Initially, Southworth’s handling of compelled funding of political 
speech cannot be easily reconciled with that of Abood and Keller. In all 
three cases, there were compelled contributions to third parties. In all three 
cases, the challengers objected that their money was being spent to support 
political activities with which they disagreed. But in Southworth, the 
students were not entitled to a pro rata refund, while the complainants in 
Abood and Keller were. The difference between the three is that in 
Southworth, the Court upheld the compelled political and ideological 
contributions because it accepted the university’s important interest in 
conveying a wide variety of messages, including those with which some 
students disagreed.265 According to the Southworth Court, the Abood/Keller 
approach of “limiting the required subsidy to [fund only] speech germane 
to the purpose” of the university was “unworkable” because determining 
what speech is germane to the university’s purpose of exposing students to 
unexplored and diverse speech and ideas was contrary to the very goal the 
university sought to pursue.266 In Abood and Keller, by contrast, the Court 
 
 260 Id. at 220, 231–32. 
 261 Id. at 231–32. 
 262 Id. at 231. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. at 233–34. 
 265 Id. at 232–33. Moreover, the Southworth Court observed the impossibility of discerning which 
speech is germane to this university purpose, noting even in the labor union context, the Court has 
“encountered difficulties in deciding what is germane and what is not.” Id. at 232. Therefore, in 
Southworth, the Court protected student First Amendment interests through requiring viewpoint 
neutrality, rather than through a pro rata refund. 
 266 Id. at 231–32. 
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did not find a union or bar’s  political speech activities to be germane to its 
core purposes or goals. In other words, the distinction between Southworth, 
Keller, and Abood is not in whether there was compelled expression but in 
whether in the Court’s view, the expression was sufficiently justified to 
meet the institution’s core goals. The justifiability of compelled 
expression—if not accepted as a core institutional goal on its face as it was 
in Southworth—is determined and limited by the statutory duties, as it was 
in Glickman. 
IV. RECONCILING MODERN FIRST AMENDMENT PRECEDENT WITH ABOOD 
AND FUTURE PUBLIC SECTOR AGENCY FEE CASES 
Without overruling Abood, the current Court has modified First 
Amendment doctrine and expanded its protections in such a way that has 
reopened the constitutionality question of agency fees in the public sector. 
If the doctrinal inconsistencies were not clear enough, Justice Alito’s not-
so-subtle dicta in Knox and Harris most certainly conveyed the message 
that the Court was finally prepared to overrule Abood and hold that the 
First Amendment forbids agency shop agreements and fees in the public 
sector.267 But a 4–4 decision in Friedrichs saved review of Abood’s 
rationale for another day.268 With the Supreme Court now having a full 
complement of Justices and review of Janus v. AFSCME impending, the 
demise of Abood and the agency fees it permits may be imminent. 
The preceding sections of this Article have attempted to show why 
any bright-line approach to agency fees in the public sector would be ill 
fitting. Public union activities are too transient for such an approach, and 
state statutes are too diverse amongst jurisdictions. Thus, this final Section 
proposes a workable compromise by suggesting that all agency fees are 
indeed some form of compelled expression—but should be treated as 
compelled political contributions in campaign finance, not as purely 
political speech. Under the modern compelled contribution analysis, the 
question of whether agency fees are “expressive” or “political” does not 
doom their constitutionality under strict or exacting scrutiny review.269 
Instead, because the expressive purposes are more attenuated than pure 
speech, the limitations placed on contributions must be “closely drawn” to 
match a “sufficiently important [government] interest.”270 While compelled 
 
 267 See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2643 (2014) (citing Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 
Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 312 (2012)). 
 268 See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016). 
 269 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21, 
25, 29 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
 270 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 94–95 (2001) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1, 25). 
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contributions must be reasonable, legislatures should be accorded 
substantial deference in articulating their sufficiently important interests.271 
Although this modern framework for compelled contributions is 
largely consistent with the Court’s 1976 decision in Buckley, the Court has 
at times strayed from this appropriate understanding.272 However, with the 
Court’s recent clarifications in McCutcheon, Buckley’s analysis and 
“closely drawn scrutiny” appear to have been restored to their proper place 
for at least the time being. 
A. Adopting a Compelled Contribution Framework Respects the States’ 
Choice of Regulatory Regime   
Adopting the compelled contribution framework for agency fee cases 
in the public sector is superior to a hard-line approach because it enables 
courts to give deference to state legislative efforts in the area of public 
sector collective bargaining. Under the framework articulated in 
McCutcheon, a case challenging campaign contribution limits under the 
First Amendment, the first step of the constitutional analysis is to 
determine whether the government has asserted a sufficiently important 
interest.273 Once the government asserts an important interest, courts can 
then assess whether that interest is linked to the policy choice necessitating 
the compelled limitation or contribution.274 McCutcheon articulated that 
while strict and exacting scrutiny pay close attention to this fit between the 
important government interest and legislative policy choices,275 closely 
drawn scrutiny’s flexibility allots for a less precise fit between the 
government interests and its chosen prophylactic scheme. 
In McCutcheon and its predecessors, the state government’s important 
interest in limiting contributions was to prevent quid pro quo corruption. In 
Abood and its successors, the state government’s important interest in 
compelling contributions is to promote efficient labor relations and prevent 
“free riding.” Both quid pro quo prevention and promoting efficient labor 
relations state interests are somewhat abstruse state interests, and their 
remedying statutes would be hard to justify as the best preventative matters 
and easy to dispute. However, while this imperfect fit most likely dooms 
 
 271 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1480. 
 272 Compare Riddle v. Hickenlooper, 742 F.3d 922, 930 (10th Cir. 2014) (Tenth Circuit concluding 
that “exacting scrutiny” means a level of review just shy of strict scrutiny), with Worley v. Cruz-
Bustillo, 717 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2013) (Eleventh Circuit finding that “exacting scrutiny” is little more 
than simple rational basis review). 
 273 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444. 
 274 See id. at 1441. 
 275 Id. 
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Abood’s (and McCutcheon’s) state legislative purpose under a strict or 
exacting scrutiny analysis, these interests could survive under a “closely 
drawn” scrutiny analysis, especially if courts afford the same judicial 
deference to congressional expertise in labor statutes as it does to campaign 
finance. 
Lesser attention to the fit between governments interests and policy 
choices is imperative if agency fees are to survive future First Amendment 
analysis because it is nearly impossible to prove that agency fees are the 
only means to efficient labor relations and preventing free riding. In an 
exclusive bargaining regime, what is strikingly damning to such a tailored 
attempt is that twenty-eight states and the federal government currently 
perform labor functions within a “right to work,” or agency fee-free 
jurisdiction. While it could be argued that these are far less efficient labor 
regimes than those that permit agency fee collections in one form or 
another, accepting legislative bodies’ propriety determinations requires 
removal of the strict, or even exacting, scrutiny standards of review. 
B. Adopting a Compelled Contribution Framework and Lesser Scrutiny 
Standard Is True to the First Amendment Doctrine 
Adopting the compelled contribution framework and lesser “closely 
drawn” scrutiny standard in agency fee jurisprudence is true to the 
foundational First Amendment principles of political speech and 
association. While this Article takes no position on Citizens United’s 
controversial decision that organizational contributions are sufficiently 
expressive to trigger First Amendment protections, it recognizes that 
scholars have logically argued both for and against it.276 Largely 
uncontroversial, however, is the position that the spending of money—
while not itself speech—is necessary for effective advocacy in the United 
States. As the Court has long recognized, “virtually every means of 
communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of 
money.”277 But contributions do not express a particular message or 
“communicate the underlying basis for the support.”278 For these reasons, 
since Buckley, the First Amendment has protected money’s expressive 
value to a lesser extent than pure speech or expression.279 
 
 276 See, e.g., Nadia Imtanes, Should Corporations Be Entitled to the Same First Amendment 
Protections as People?, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 203 (2012). 
 277 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam). 
 278 Id. at 21. 
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McCutcheon provided significant clarification as to what this extent 
actually was. While it declined to venture into the realm of strict scrutiny 
for financial expressions of any kind, McCutcheon applied “exacting 
scrutiny” to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political 
expression, such as political expenditures.280 However, because limits on 
contributions “impose a lesser restraint on political speech” than do limits 
on expenditures, they are subject to “a lesser but still ‘rigorous [closely 
drawn] standard of review.’”281 With “closely drawn” scrutiny, “[e]ven a 
significant interference with protected rights . . . may be sustained if the 
State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means 
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational 
freedoms.”282 
To apply anything more than closely drawn scrutiny to agency fee 
analysis in First Amendment challenges would give more credence to 
compelled monetary contributions than the First Amendment intends. Even 
voluntary contributions to a union, until aggregated, have little expressive 
value. The contribution amount is small, and the purposes behind its 
donation can be vastly diverse. Union members, who voluntarily give 
money to a union, surely do not believe in every cause the union supports 
or even that their money is being well spent. But because their contribution 
is voluntary, it is accepted as a general expression of support of the union. 
Remove the voluntary aspect of contributions, and their expressive purpose 
is even less. 
C. Adopting the Compelled Contribution Model Means Courts Will Not 
Have to Choose Between Objecting Payers’ and Unions’ Rights 
Because of modern First Amendment law’s disjointedness, choosing 
to adopt one precedent over another requires a bit of cherry picking.283 
Agency fee objectors who claim such fees violate payers’ First Amendment 
rights are guilty of this because in preserving the rights of nonmembers, 
they ignore the rights of unions and union members to engage in First 
Amendment activities. Their attention to dissenters is not wholly 
inconsistent with the individual speech protections of the First Amendment, 
 
 280 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44). The “exacting scrutiny” 
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which place a premium on unfettered discourse. However, on the campaign 
spending side, because the Court recognizes that restricted spending is less 
of an encroachment than restricted speech, it has developed a more 
reasonable balancing method of individual infringements with other 
interests. 
In prior agency fee cases, the Court has assessed the constitutionality 
of agency fee agreements by balancing the First Amendment rights of 
agency fee payers against the government’s interest in combatting free 
riders and promoting labor peace. But this distorts the balancing scale 
because it portrays only one side (the payers) as having First Amendment 
rights, while portraying the other as having only a statutory interest. 
Citizens United’s expansion of First Amendment rights to expressive 
groups, however, necessitates a rezeroing of this scale.284 If unions enjoy 
First Amendment protections as expressive associations, should not their 
rights also factor into this agency fee analysis? Should not the First 
Amendment rights of a union, composed of real working people and 
governed by democratic rules and majority consensus, receive at least the 
same rights to influence the political process as an “artificial . . . 
invisible . . . and existing only in contemplation of law” corporation?285 
Moreover, if courts are going to protect nonmembers from being forced to 
subsidize activities, should not they also protect unions from being forced 
to subsidize nonmember activities and prohibit a duty of fair representation 
regime?286 
D. Suggestions for “Closely Drawn” Statutory Frameworks 
If the Court adopts the framework for agency fee analysis articulated 
in this Article, the logical next inquiry will consider what exactly a closely 
drawn statutory framework that passes constitutional muster looks like. In 
large part, I leave this query for future scholarly works but with the 
following broad suggestions. 
First, although “closely drawn” scrutiny will tolerate even 
“significant” right infringements, legislative and union bodies advocating 
for agency fees should consider statutory models that limit this 
infringement to the utmost extent.287 For example, nonmember agency fee 
payers should be able to participate in union surveys within their collective 
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bargaining unit when such surveys impact the union collective bargaining 
strategies that their fees subsidize.288 Moreover, they should be able to vote 
on union proposals, contract ratification, and other elective matters. 
Because their agency fees are going to support these union activities, they 
should be given the same opportunities for voice as other members in these 
union matters. Many unions already do survey an entire bargaining unit on 
certain employment issues, and in future challenges, this fact should be 
pertinent to a court’s analysis under “closely drawn” scrutiny analysis. 
However, in future legislative schemes, lawmakers should consider 
mandating such voter rights for agency-fee-subsidized representatives. 
Once lawmakers establish this floor, unions may also choose to experiment 
with other additional means of promoting agency-fee-payer voice and 
participation in internal union matters. For example, they may undertake 
certain controversial union activities only after approval by a voting 
majority (or supermajority) of their particular bargaining unit. 
Second, limiting the rights infringements of agency fees may be 
brought about by limiting the agency fees themselves. Obviously, if the 
Court adopts the “closely drawn” framework for agency-fee-permitting 
statutes, the more detailed the regulatory language articulating the 
representative’s duties, bargaining subjects, and relation to the limited fee, 
the better.289 Seemingly vague agency fee limits or arbitrary 
proportionalities of fees without justification will probably fail this scrutiny 
standard.290 
After specific regulatory language is drafted, unions themselves may 
want to consider what is not explicitly included in the defined duties of an 
exclusive bargaining representative and use these exclusions to create their 
own limited agency fee models with the nonmembers they represent. For 
example, while the duties of an exclusive bargaining representative 
generally include “contract administration,” they usually do not include 
language for “free contract administration.” Thus, perhaps unions could 
offer a lesser agency fee calculation for those nonmembers who agree to 
contract away their right to obtain free union representation in grievances. 
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These members could instead be charged a fair market rate for the union’s 
grievance representation services, should they end up needing it during a 
year when they had waived that right. 
CONCLUSION 
With Janus v. AFSCME, the Court may finally have the last word on 
agency fees in the public sector. But given the vast diversity in state 
collective bargaining statutes and agency fee provisions, the legitimate and 
complex interests at stake, and the evolving contours of First Amendment 
jurisprudence, it would be unwise to entirely foreclose the possibility of 
agency shop agreements and fees. A case-by-case analysis of agency fees 
and their relation to a union’s statutory duties is a better fit for our modern 
jurisprudence and our ever-changing political reality. Reexamining agency 
fees in the public sector through the compelled contribution doctrine and 
closely drawn scrutiny standard of campaign finance law offers this kind of 
flexibility. 
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